This climate diplomacy should help promote a positive understanding of China in Europe and Latin America during these complex geopolitical times. It should also, through multilateral cooperation, inject new energy and impetus into global climate governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since signing the Paris Agreement in 2015, China has attached much importance to bilateral climate cooperation. China and the US, despite tensions, have both treated the climate as a safer space in which to maintain cooperation, and although there have been setbacks<\/a>, talks have not completely stopped. China has consistently taken climate issues seriously both at home and internationally, using bilateral and multilateral climate diplomacy to seek opportunities for cooperation and to contribute to international climate governance. The author believes China\u2019s active involvement in such diplomacy will increase understanding of its climate policy and action. When the outside world recognises China\u2019s actions and successes on climate change, there will be benefits for climate governance both at home and worldwide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Climate change is a systemic issue requiring a systemic response. No country can stand alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Emissions data<\/a> show that cooperation between the largest emitters is crucial for achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement. In 2021, the six biggest emitters (China, the US, the EU, India, Russia, India and Japan) together accounted for 68% of global emissions; China, the US and the EU were responsible for over 50%, while the two biggest economies, China and the US, accounted for over 40%. The response to climate change must be a joint undertaking, and cooperation is essential for driving global climate governance forward.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A look back shows that despite difficulties and reversals, when the big emitters set a good example, it can have a real impact. For example, in March 2020, the EU enshrined its carbon neutrality target in law, and many countries followed suit. China\u2013US cooperation once drove global climate policy design and ultimately led to the Paris Agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But climate governance is suffering from a trust deficit. Discussions of issues such as \u201chow to decide who does what?\u201d and \u201cwho acts first?\u201d have been had over and over again. The trust deficit \u2013 both within and between global north and global south countries \u2013 is an obvious constraint on global climate governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There is no clearer example of this than finance for the Green Climate Fund<\/a>. In 2010, the COP16 climate talks decided that, to help developing nations respond to climate change, developed nations should provide US$30 billion in rapid start-up funding by 2012, and a further $100 billion annually from 2013 to 2020. However, the definitions of what counts as climate funding, the associated statistics, and reporting and verification systems, remain unclear and often controversial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to OECD, in 2020 developed countries provided and leveraged $83.3 billion<\/a> for climate action in developing countries, while the $100 billion per year goal could be met this year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A lack of leadership is another major impediment to climate action. The EU often leads by example, both in climate governance and action. But various obstacles \u2013 its own growth issues, and inadequate internal cohesion and unity \u2013 mean it cannot achieve all it would like to. Meanwhile, the polarised politics of the US mean its actions on climate have gone from one extreme to the other, with Democrats forging ahead and Republicans hitting reverse. The Donald Trump administration promoted an America-first unilateralism, with various backwards moves on the climate wrecking the country\u2019s standing and leadership, and hindering the sound development of global climate governance. Since he assumed office in 2021, President Joe Biden has brought in ambitious legislation and spending<\/a> on climate action. However, nobody can guarantee that Trump won\u2019t return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Against this background of conflict and crisis, global warming is worsening and the window for action continues to shrink. Global climate governance is under unprecedented pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since formal diplomacy began in 1979, the relationship between China and the US has seen ups and downs, but a crisis was always followed by a quick return to healthy relations. Here is a timeline of the key cooperative moments since 1997.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1997 1998 1999 2003 2006 2008 2014 2015 2021 The years 2014 and 2015 were particularly crucial, as they underpinned the Paris Agreement which has guided global climate governance ever since. And since the Biden administration came to power, there have been frequent climate interactions between the countries. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2021, there was a phone call between the two leaders at Chinese New Year; strategic talks in Alaska that March; spring and autumn talks between the two nations\u2019 climate envoys in Shanghai and Tianjin; a further presidential phone call in September; and in November, the Glasgow joint declaration on climate action. In good times and bad, climate has always been on the agenda and progress made, if bumpily.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But overall relations have gone into freefall since the Covid-19 pandemic took hold. Wang Jisi, a professor at Peking University\u2019s School of International Studies and head of the university\u2019s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, has said<\/a>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cChina\u2013US relations have been worsening since the latter part of the Trump administration, with disagreements intensifying on trade, technology, military affairs and ideology. Biden retained the bulk of Trump-era policies on China, but has focused more on the use of guardrails to manage the relationship. Currently we are more than halfway through Biden\u2019s first term and relations continue to worsen thanks to the war in Ukraine, tensions over Taiwan and the US\u2019s technological decoupling.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Talks on methane emissions, clean power, the circular economy and urban climate action were planned for September 2022, but the visit by Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the US House of Representatives, to Taiwan in August, despite strong objections from the Chinese government, put an end to the work. There is one ray of hope: there have been reports<\/a> that US climate envoy John Kerry is to visit China, which may restart climate diplomacy between the two countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the pauses with the US, China has been making steady progress in other bilateral and multilateral climate efforts since signing the Paris Agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment\u2019s records on international cooperation<\/a>, China has been expanding the scope of its interactions, maintaining cooperation and exchanges with the EU, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), African nations and the BRICS group of Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa. It has also participated in multilateral climate diplomacy with its neighbours, by attending meetings such as the Second Forum on Carbon Neutrality Goals of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Interactions on climate have been seen frequently and with a number of countries in recent months. April\u2019s China\u2013France Joint Statement<\/a> had 51 articles, eight of which were on climate issues. The statement made climate change part of the two countries\u2019 joint response to the challenges of globalisation. This lays a good foundation for their future climate diplomacy and hopefully more concrete measures. For example, Article 36 reads:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cFrance and China intend to cooperate to resolve the difficulties in accessing financing in developing and emerging economies, and to encourage them to speed up their energy and climate transition while supporting sustainable development. China will take part in the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in Paris in June 2023. France will attend the third \u2018Belt and Road\u2019 Forum for International Cooperation.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n April also saw the release of the Brazil\u2013China Joint Statement on Combating Climate Change<\/a>. Some of the articles are of particular interest. Article 5, for example, states:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cWe are determined to further strengthen multilateralism, including with all our partners within the Group of 77 and China (G77+China), with a view to a model of climate solidarity that is collective, that rejects unilateralism and green trade barriers, and that is firmly grounded on values of solidarity and cooperation in our international community\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, Article 7 reads: \u201cWe urge developed countries to honour their unfulfilled climate finance obligations, and to commit to their new collective quantified goal that goes well beyond the floor of USD 100 billion per year and provide a clear roadmap of doubling adaptation finance.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Accurately evaluating China\u2019s climate diplomacy and its future direction is not just important to China \u2013 it is also important for the process of global climate governance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China is still a developing nation, with uneven levels of socioeconomic development, a coal-heavy energy mix, and a comparatively weak foundation in science and technology. But between 2012 and 2021, it saw<\/a> economic growth average 6.5%, while energy consumption increased by an average of only 3%. The enormous efforts China has made towards its low-carbon transition deserve to be seen and valued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A review of its domestic action on climate change and its climate diplomacy overseas finds there has been criticism<\/a> and questioning<\/a>, particularly of institutional arrangements, allocation of staff and funding, and policy focus. But China has continued to take active, responsible and sustainable measures, both at home and abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\nMajor power cooperation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"Chinese](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2023\/06\/Chinese-President-Xi-Jinping-and-French-President-Emmanuel-Macron-have-tea-at-a-garden-in-Guangzhou-China_Huang-Jingwen_Alamy_2PKFXA1.jpg\")
<\/div>China\u2013US relations, a timeline<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>President Jiang Zemin visits the US, and signs a bilateral deal to cooperate on energy and the environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>Bill Clinton pays a return visit to China, and signs a letter of intent to cooperate on monitoring urban air quality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>The two countries sign another letter of intent, this time to cooperate on clean air and clean energy technology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>A China\u2013US Working Group on Climate Change is formed, to further technical cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>The China\u2013US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) framework is created, which would see top leaders from both countries meet twice a year, in what one person on the US side referred to as \u201csort of like a G2<\/a>\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>A framework for energy and environment cooperation over the coming decade is signed during the fourth round of the SED.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>The two countries sign a Joint Statement on Climate Change.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>Xi Jinping and Barack Obama announce a Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change, to work together to make a success of the upcoming Paris climate conference, which will lead to the Paris Agreement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/strong>At COP26<\/a>, the two countries announce a Joint Glasgow Declaration on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n![\"Climate](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2022\/08\/US-and-Chinese-climate-envoys-at-COP26_Alamy_2H65FED-scaled.jpg\")
<\/div>Promoting multilateral climate diplomacy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
China\u2019s climate measures, at home and abroad<\/h2>\n\n\n\n