Typical punishments included the loss of a year\u2019s fuel subsidies \u2013 vital for the profitability of many boats<\/a> \u2013 cancellation of fishing licenses, and fishing bans of up to five years for named captains and crew members.<\/p>\n The list included the vessel Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999, which was\u00a0caught<\/a> in Ecuador\u2019s Galapagos Marine Reserve in August 2017. In its hull were almost 300 tonnes of fish on board, including more than 6,600 sharks and endangered species such as hammerheads. Twenty crew members received prison sentences of between one and four years.<\/p>\n Distant water fishing companies and crews were not expecting the changes.<\/p>\n In December 2017, the government published plans to control the\u00a0size of the DWF sector and increase regulation over the\u00a013th<\/sup> Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020). The Ministry of Agriculture then quickly followed up in the same month by announcing the creation of a blacklist system<\/a>, publishing its first list two months later. Captains and company bosses on the list are banned from working in the fishing industry.<\/p>\n Why the sudden crackdown? At the time,\u00a0Yu Kangzhen<\/a>, deputy agriculture minister, said \u201csome DWF companies are small and weak, with poor management, little safety awareness and continuing breaches of overseas regulations\u201d.<\/p>\n Liu Bolei, oceans campaigner with Greenpeace East Asia<\/a>, says repeated breaches by DWF vessels have put the ministry under pressure, which prompted a more hands-on approach.<\/p>\n Since 2003, regulations have included provisions for banning offenders from the industry, but bans have never been made public – before now. Nobody knew if breaches were punished, or how.<\/p>\n Removal of the year\u2019s fuel subsidies is an effective punishment (providing half the revenue of some companies), but falls short of a ban.<\/p>\n \u201cA captain who loses his license will, if he wants to be a captain again, have to wait five years and then go through all the tests again, from the bottom. Realistically they\u2019ll never get their old position back,\u201d says Tang Jianye<\/a>, professor of international fisheries law and policy at Shanghai Ocean University.\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Punishing the culprits alone won\u2019t solve China’s DWF industry\u2019s problems. The\u00a0sector has expanded over the past three decades to become the world\u2019s largest. But regulation and professionalism have not kept pace with the sector’s explosive growth.<\/p>\n In particular, there were many new, small entrants to the DWF sector during the 12th<\/sup> Five-Year Plan period (2010-2015).<\/p>\n \u201cAs [the new entrants] hadn\u2019t worked in the sector before, there was an increase in breaches of regulations,\u201d says Tang Jianye. \u201cThey\u2019ve learned idea [of the rules], but nothing concrete,\u201d he adds.<\/p>\n <\/div>\n To tackle this, Shanghai Ocean University and the China DWF Association provided compliance training to fishing company managers last September, explained the rules of regional fishery bodies and national laws in other jurisdictions.<\/p>\n The problem is compounded by the limited enforcement capabilities of nations where China\u2019s DWF vessels operate, which leads to complacency among fishermen.<\/p>\n For example, over half of China\u2019s almost 2,900 DWF vessels pay fees to fish in exclusive economic zones (EEZs) \u2013 areas outside national waters but where a nation has exclusive resource rights.<\/p>\n The secure access to another country\u2019s EEZ, typically China will enter into an agreement with the host nation, which itemises its fishery stocks, permissible catches and regulations. China then provides data on fishing vessels and pays a fee.<\/p>\n Some nations are unable to assess fishery stocks or set catch quotas, however, fishing still takes place as long as the fees are paid. Other countries lack the capacity to effectively enforce regulations. <\/div><\/p>\n Fish are not restricted by national boundaries so vessels commonly fish in the waters of countries that have the weakest regulation.<\/p>\n China\u2019s DWF fleet is active in the EEZs of over 40 nations. Regulatory weak spots and poor enforcement encourage illegal behaviour.<\/p>\n Professor Tang says agreements are likely to become more robust as more countries adopt similar language to the EU\u2019s 2013 Common Fisheries Policy. It emphasises \u201cthe best available scientific advice and relevant information exchange, ensuring a sustainable exploitation of the marine biological resources\u201d, and \u201ctransparency\u201d, contributing to \u201cthe establishment of a high quality governance framework to ensure, in particular, efficient data collection, monitoring, control and surveillance measures\u201d.<\/p>\n Without fuel subsidies many DWF companies would be loss-making<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Controlling the behaviour of Chinese vessels, and the fishing capacity of the fleet, is crucial to limiting illegal fishing globally.<\/p>\n China\u2019s DWF sector is still growing: its 2016 catch of 1.9 million tonnes was up 78% on 2010.<\/p>\n The government intends to restrict the size of the DFW fleet to 3,000 boats by 2020, yet the catch is still set to rise to 2.3 million tonnes. Such growth in catch size is supported by generous state subsidies. These date back to 2006 when rising fuel prices prompted the government to subsidise fuel for fishing vessels, partly to ensure adequate catches.<\/p>\n Between 2006 and 2014, the cost of fuel subsidies rocketed from 281 million yuan (about US$41 million) to 4.2 billion yuan (about US$600 million). Without fuel subsidies many DWF companies would be loss-making.<\/p>\n China started to cut subsidy levels in 2016, but in 2018 they still stood at 3.6 billion<\/a> yuan (about US$520 million).<\/p>\n Ryan Michael Penney, a PhD candidate in anthropology at Stanford University and maritime policy analyst at ChinaPolicy who is researching China’s maritime industry,\u00a0predicts deeper cuts.<\/p>\n \u201cI expect to see China continue to become more flexible in discussions on fishery fuel subsidies, which remains one of the biggest issues for regulating DWF industry production,\u201d he says<\/p>\n Another regulatory approach is to improve the management and tracking of vessels and their catches when they reach port.<\/p>\n China unveiled a plan this year\u00a0to build 10 fishing port clusters with facilities to enable better data collection on catches.<\/p>\n The upgrades, which will take place between 2018 and 2025, will help prevent illegal catches reaching the market.<\/p>\n According to Penney, there is a severe lack of port checks so the new facilities should make a difference.<\/p>\n \u201cChina has not yet joined the key Port States Measures Agreement<\/a>, and does not currently have the capacity to perform the inspections it calls for, but I expect to see them move toward joining as they develop the capacity,\u201d he says.<\/p>\n The Port States Measures Agreement is a binding international agreement targeting illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and applies to any vessel requesting access to host nation ports. There are currently 55 signatories*<\/a> to the agreement, including the United States, Japan and Korea.<\/p>\n Penney says that if China wants to have more of a say on DWF then it should look to strengthen domestic legislation and align itself with international industry practices.<\/p>\nSurprise shake-up<\/h2>\n
![\"USCGC](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/28088362377_6b7f01271d_o-e1536061817753.jpg\")
Rapid growth, poor regulation<\/h2>\n
![\"Fishing](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2018\/09\/Global-Fishing-Watch-China-fishing-activity-2012-2018-1.gif\")
Weak global enforcement<\/h2>\n
\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/Screen-Shot-2018-08-31-at-10.52.29.png\")
Cutting fuel subsidies<\/h2>\n
Better dockside checks<\/h2>\n
![\"The](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2018\/08\/Screen-Shot-2018-08-31-at-10.52.03.png\")