Jalife-Rahme\u2019s visit to Bolivia was not a casual one. At the event, he reinforced the idea of maintaining state control over industrialisation<\/a>, almost a year after the Bolivian government relaunched its strategy to export value-added lithium, including at two additional salt flats beyond the better known Uyuni: Pastos Grandes, in the department of Potos\u00ed, and Coipasa, in neighbouring Oruro.<\/p>\n If you were to ask me which is the country of the future in the current context of lithium, we would give the same answer: Bolivia<\/p><\/blockquote>\n In a country where state control over lithium and other natural resources has long been prioritised, particularly under the former government of Evo Morales, last year\u2019s strategy saw a slight break towards an international call for proposals<\/a> to work with foreign private companies that use direct lithium extraction (DLE) methods. Gonzalo Mondaca, a researcher at the Bolivian Centre for Documentation and Information (CEDIB<\/a>), describes DLE as \u201ca set of technologies that use absorbent resins, solvents and other materials such as filters or special membranes to accelerate the mineral extraction process.\u201d<\/p>\n In this context, Jalife-Rahme told the gathered audience of around 500 people that, \u201cLithium must be defended. You must have plans, because you are going to have a lot of vultures around.\u201d<\/p>\n Last June, the names of the six companies and partnerships in the running to work with Yacimientos de Litio Boliviano (YLB) \u2013 the state company responsible for the resource\u2019s exploitation \u2013 became known, with particular interest from China.<\/p>\n They are: Brunp, a subsidiary of battery maker CATL, alongside China Molybdenum (CMOC); the CITIC Guoan Group, together with the China Railway International Group (CRIG); the Xinjiang TBEA Group; and Fusion Enertech, also from China. The United States\u2019 Lilac Solutions and Russia\u2019s Uranium One Group make up the list.<\/p>\n \u201cThe next step is to meet with the companies to present our sovereign conditions regarding lithium,\u201d said<\/a> YLB president Carlos Ramos, adding that it could work with more than one firm in order to accelerate industrialisation.<\/p>\n The technology for production currently used at Uyuni, which consists of solar evaporation, will allegedly be obsolete within 40 years, with \u201c40% of the equipment that is important in industrialisation\u201d set to be lost, according to former president of YLB Marcelo Gonzales, cited in a 2021 report<\/a> by CEDIB researcher Mondaca. <\/div>Mondaca told Di\u00e1logo Chino that he sees this change in strategy as significant for several reasons. One is that the facilities built on the Uyuni salt flats are very different from those needed for DLE technologies. Clarity is also needed on how the waste will be managed after the lithium extraction process. Most important, he said, is clarity over the amount of freshwater the process will use.<\/p>\n From a technical point of view, Juan Carlos Zuleta, a lithium economics analyst and former executive manager of YLB, explains that while it is known what type of samples were given to the companies for evaluation, it is not known at what stage of the solar evaporation process their reported potential lithium recovery rates were calculated, nor the overall efficiency of each firm.<\/p>\n Zuleta raises questions over which stage DLE technologies would be applied to the existing infrastructure in the Salar de Uyuni. \u201cIf it is done in the first phase of extraction, this affects the raw material to be used in the industrial potassium chloride plant,\u201d he highlights. On the other hand, if the mineral is extracted in later phases, the possibility of having residual brine, which is used in the processing of lithium hydroxide \u2013 the main element for the production of battery cathodes \u2013 is eliminated.<\/p>\n In this context, DLE technologies would have to be applied using a hybrid model, consisting of the use of brine extracted at some stage during the solar evaporation process. If so, based on experiences such as those of China, where such a hybrid system has been in use since 2017, Zuleta notes that total lithium recovery rates would not exceed 59%. This contradicts what was stated by the president of YLB, who had announced<\/a> that the six selected companies reported a lithium recovery rate \u201chigher than 80% and even higher than 90% in some cases\u201d.<\/p>\n Regarding the extraction and processing of lithium and other evaporite resources in the Pastos Grandes and Coipasa salt flats, included in the new Bolivian strategy, \u201cwe would have to think about [building] new infrastructure, with costs that are around 900 million to 1 billion dollars, according to data I obtained from a [similar] project that is underway in Argentina,\u201d said Zuleta.<\/p>\n The Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy did not respond to requests for information on the government\u2019s position on the issue.<\/p>\n Bolivian efforts to exploit lithium date back more than three decades. They are closely linked to the social struggle of the people of Potos\u00ed, the mining region par excellence<\/a> since colonial times, to improve the quality of life of its inhabitants. The department, located in the south of the country, generates one of its larger sources of income \u2013 nearly US$2 billion in exports<\/a> each year, with 88% coming from mining in 2021 \u2013 but paradoxically has the highest poverty rates, according to data<\/a> from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).<\/p>\n \u201cWe who are the owners [of the minerals] are left with poverty and pollution,\u201d said Roxana Graz, president of the Potos\u00ed Civic Committee (COMCIPO), the body that represents civil society institutions and is leading protests in the region, demanding more attention from the government. The most recent was a blockade and strike<\/a>, which took place mainly in the provincial capital, also named Potos\u00ed, on 5 July.<\/p>\n We who are the owners of the minerals are left with poverty and pollution<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Graz\u2019s assessment relates to attempts by various Bolivian governments since the 1980s to sign contracts with foreign companies, which almost always have economic disadvantages, according to a study<\/a> entitled \u201cA present without a future: The lithium industrialisation project in Bolivia\u201d. The most recent attempt was in 2019, when the government of Evo Morales chose to cancel contracts with firms from Germany (ACI Systems) and China (Xinjiang TBEA), due to protests in Potos\u00ed demanding royalties and better conditions for the country. The now ex-president even attributes his overthrow<\/a> to foreign interest in controlling the mineral.<\/p>\n As a result of constant demands and in order to maintain control of lithium and other mineral resources, laws such as the Mining Law<\/a> (2014) and the Law for the Creation of Bolivian Lithium Deposits \u2013 YLB<\/a> (2017) were modified and enacted, which make it clear that all extraction and industrialisation processes must be in the hands of the state. But this intention has not been enough to achieve success.<\/p>\n In 2008, during the Morales presidency, Bolivia made a foray into lithium industrialisation with a US$771 million loan from the Central Bank of Bolivia, according to the Fundaci\u00f3n Sol\u00f3n<\/a>, a Bolivian NGO. Currently, the country has a potassium chloride industrial plant, which cost the state US$188.1 million<\/a>, and a lithium carbonate industrial plant is under construction \u2013 also state-funded to the tune of US$110 million<\/a> \u2013 which is expected to be completed soon. Both are located in the Uyuni salt flat.<\/p>\n In an interview<\/a> with state media, the vice-minister of high energy technologies, \u00c1lvaro Arnez, said that around 990 tonnes of lithium carbonate were produced and sold in 2021, for which 75 million bolivianos (around US$11 million) was received, adding that lithium production is growing in the country.<\/p>\n Lithium carbonate is a key raw material for the manufacture of batteries for electronic equipment, including electric vehicles. Potassium chloride, meanwhile, is one of the components of NPK, a fertiliser made up of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium.<\/p>\n Diego Von Vacano is a Bolivian professor of political science at Texas A&M University in the United States. As a former informal advisor to President Luis Arce on lithium issues, he welcomes the fact that companies from three countries \u2013 China, Russia and the US \u2013 with different political ideologies are involved in this new bidding process with DLE technologies. However, he warns that this coincides with a geopolitical context marked by the war between Russia and Ukraine and that \u201ccomplicates the landscape\u201d.<\/p>\n In the case of signing with the Russian company, this could affect broader markets. \u201cI think Bolivia should have some kind of agreement with Russia, but I\u2019m not so sure that lithium is the right area,\u201d he tells Di\u00e1logo Chino.<\/p>\nNew process, new questions<\/h2>\n
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A long history<\/h2>\n
Bolivia in the eyes of the world<\/h2>\n
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