Editor\u2019s note<\/p>
Shadow Fleet Secrets is an ongoing investigative project initiated by Follow the Money in collaboration with Dialogue Earth. Thirteen other newsrooms are involved, including SourceMaterial, S\u00fcddeutsche Zeitung, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, and Inside Story, as well as 40 journalists from around the world. This international collaboration explores the ownership structures of vessels in the shadow fleet, and sheds light on the often-overlooked crews operating these ships. Read more stories from this project at Follow the Money<\/a>.<\/p><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n Initial reports from Ceres I\u2019s officers claimed the ship was stationary, apparently anchored due to a technical malfunction. Ship-tracking data told a different story. Analysts at the maritime news agency Lloyd\u2019s List observed<\/a> the ship making erratic movements prior to the collision \u2013 inconsistent with it being safely anchored, and raising suspicions about the true nature of the incident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ceres I was already notorious. Since June 2023, Lloyd\u2019s List had linked the vessel to the \u201cshadow fleet\u201d. These are vessels known to transport oil from countries such as Russia, Venezuela and Iran, sanctioned by many western nations and therefore unable to use a lot of the legal routes for trading fossil fuels at market prices. Shadow ships rely on deceptive practices to evade international oversight. They frequently change where they are registered and disable their automatic identification systems (AIS), which track ship locations and are designed to reduce collision risks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Neither the insurer nor owner of Ceres I has commented on the collision. Whatever its causes, the ship\u2019s status in the shadow fleet makes discovering the truth (and holding the correct parties to account) a far more difficult task.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fortunately, only Hafnia Nile was carrying cargo at the time of the collision. Its 300,000 barrels of naphtha fuelled the fire. But had Ceres I been laden with a full cargo of two million barrels of crude oil, the collision could have triggered one of the worst oil spills in recent memory. Marine ecosystems and coastal economies in the region would have been devastated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This near-catastrophe occurred just hours after EU leaders signed<\/a> a call to action that pledged to confront these environmental threats. It specified \u201cships engaged in illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs or engaging in other illegal activities\u201d. Their commitment stands in sharp contrast with a hidden reality: many European crewing agencies continue to provide manpower to these dangerous vessels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tankers require crews. The recruitment machinery that gathers them for the shadow fleet is highly opaque. A tangled web of agencies, management companies and ship owners lies behind every vacancy. For seafarers like Volkov (a pseudonym to protect his identity), this web can become a trap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Three years ago, Volkov found himself standing before the captain\u2019s quarters on an oil tanker, holding a signed letter containing his crewmates\u2019 demands for better working conditions. He had left his home in Odessa five months earlier, recruited by a seemingly reputable European agency. Yet he now found himself off the coast of Venezuela, involved in what he believes was a smuggling operation. US sanctions on Venezuelan oil have spurred on this practice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n From the moment Volkov boarded the vessel, it was clear this was no ordinary gig. He says senior officers lacked control over the crew and intimidated the deck hands into working long hours, with no protection from the searing Venezuelan heat. They were also at risk of scurvy, due to the lack of fruits or vegetables on board. He alleges that in the evenings, drunken brawls between Ukrainian and Russian seafarers would go unchecked. The ship was regularly vandalised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe ships do not pass any inspections and do not enter any ports except Venezuela,\u201d Volkov says, reflecting on his time as a deck cadet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The distinctive chemical makeup of oil can show where in the world it came from. Adding different chemicals to it can change this identifying signature. \u201cWe added chemical additives to the oil for months to change the grade,\u201d says Volkov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The vessel then moved out of national jurisdiction to the high seas, where a risky ship-to-ship transfer further disguised the oil\u2019s origin. At this point, Volkov says previously missing documents for the oil cargo would suddenly appear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Volkov\u2019s experience is far from unique. Seafarers across Europe are often recruited to work on some of the world\u2019s most dangerous vessels. Maritime recruitment data analysed by Dialogue Earth and SourceMaterial suggests 68 shadow fleet vessels have crew provided by companies in European countries with sanctions against Russia and Iran. Many of these crewing agencies are based in Ukraine; others operate from Cyprus and Latvia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cEven before the current crisis in Ukraine, we knew that the situation with manning agents in the country was extremely complicated,\u201d says Steve Trowsdale, inspectorate coordinator at the International Transport Workers Federation. Agencies in Ukraine, he explains, were regulated by two separate government departments that rarely communicated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In many countries, the certification of seafarers has long been plagued by allegations that money changes hands in exchange for sailors’ work permits. Problems<\/a> with Ukraine\u2019s system have also been discussed for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThe level of corruption \u2026 was known to be systematic,\u201d Trowsdale adds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n It is not alleged that this recruitment is illegal. Some of the agencies tasked with staffing these vessels have little to no information about the ships, their cargo, or the true identities of the owners. Yet problems for these European businesses go beyond deliberate corruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In late summer 2022, the Ukraine-based crewing agency, Alpha Marine Service, posted a tanker job on Telegram without including the vessel\u2019s International Maritime Organization identification number. The details provided \u2013 such as the ship\u2019s Panamanian registry and precise deadweight tonnage \u2013 matched a vessel named Glaucus, which had featured on United Against Nuclear Iran\u2019s list of shadow fleet ships. It was later sanctioned<\/a> by the US government for smuggling Iranian oil.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Vitaliy Kovtun, CEO of Alpha Marine Service, says the job had come from a partner. \u201cWe often turn to each other for help, especially with urgent positions,\u201d he explains. Over the past two years, his agency has posted multiple vacancies for three vessels that match the details of shadow fleet ships. A lack of regulatory oversight of the partnerships that exist between licensed crewing agencies and undisclosed third parties leaves room for this abuse. \u201cIt\u2019s not the agencies at fault,\u201d Kovtun says. \u201cIt\u2019s the ship owners deceiving us.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n These networks of partnerships have become so complicated that crewing agencies supporting the shadow fleet are sometimes completely unaware of the identity of the vessels for which they advertise vacancies. Another company, Odessa Crewing Agency, listed positions for four ships that match the details of shadow fleet vessels. When asked about this by Dialogue Earth, CEO Ivan Chaika replies with resignation: \u201cUnfortunately, nobody knows the owner\u2019s name.\u201d This makes it impossible for crew to check who owns the vessels and who they are working for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As European crewing agencies continue to supply seafarers to shadow fleet vessels, they are unwittingly contributing to an environmental crisis that will only worsen as the fleet continues to operate. According to the insurance firm Allianz<\/a>, as of January 2024 the shadow fleet had been involved in over 50 incidents since Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine began, in 2022. The company tells Dialogue Earth it is working on updated figures and expects this total to have risen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Activities such as transferring oil between vessels at sea can obscure the origin of smuggled fuel, and bring major environmental risks, especially if conducted without support vessels. The International Maritime Organization\u2019s legal committee describes<\/a> open-ocean transfers as: \u201chigh-risk activities that undermined the international regime with respect to maritime safety, environmental protection and liability\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cThese tankers don\u2019t adhere to the rules,\u201d says Samir Madani, co-founder of Tanker Trackers. \u201cWe see spillages on a daily basis because ship-to-ship transfers occur without any external assistance.\u201d Such assistance is industry best practice, such as using tugboats to keep ships in position.<\/p>\n\n\n\nCrewing the shadow fleet<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The ships do not pass any inspections and do not enter any ports except Venezuela<\/blockquote><\/cite><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
Agents for who?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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<\/div>Collisions and spills<\/h2>\n\n\n\n