The Africa-China relationship, then and now<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
China is not a new player on the African continent. Almost all African countries have become recipients of Chinese aid since the mid 1950s, when China began offering overseas cooperation while it was a low-income country. Outlining this history, one participant emphasised that in China\u2019s foreign-policy thinking, such cooperation is strategic and underpins an assumption that help will be reciprocated. This would usually be in the shape of trade, access to resources or political support for China\u2019s interests, for example at the UN.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Early cooperation came in the form of government-to-government aid. By the 1980s, this had become a model of investment, finance and aid, which itself was based on Japanese and Indian strategies of overseas cooperation. In the 21st century, Chinese investments have become very much a part of the continent\u2019s economic and political landscape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The discussions highlighted how the China-Africa relationship goes beyond the purely economic. Scholarships to study in China are offered to African students and all-expenses-paid study tours and trainings in China offered to African journalists<\/a> and government officials. Free Chinese classes are also becoming increasingly common at African universities. The electric vehicles moving around African cities are Chinese, and the largest mobile phone brand in Africa is Tecno Mobile, based in Shenzhen. Meanwhile, roads and other large infrastructure projects, often referred to as gifts and tokens of friendship, cement the technocentric and industrial idea of development<\/a> that China promotes. These ties with African countries, it was pointed out, are key for China to maintain its international political status as a node of global power with its own network of allies. In this sense, China needs African countries politically just as much as they need China economically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite the long historical ties and the rise in soft power, perceptions vary on the impacts of Chinese investments and influence in the continent. It was pointed out that government views tend to be positive, primarily rooted in opportunities for economic development. While the community perceptions tend to be more negative, with participants emphasising that benefits from projects often fail to trickle down to local communities, and tensions result. Many communities, it was argued, grieve the lack of consultation and information, the displacement that often happens without proper compensation \u2013 despite existing legislation and guidelines<\/a> guaranteeing it \u2013 as well as the environmental implications, such as water and soil pollution, that jeopardise their livelihoods. It was pointed out that Chinese companies may not understand how to properly engage local communities, as they are not familiar with it from their operations in China. One participant highlighted that the negative perception among communities is not necessarily just a reaction to China, but a symptom of discontent with local politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A major focus area of the discussions was economic development, often in quite a traditional sense. Participants highlighted the need for African countries to industrialise and \u201cmove up\u201d global value chains, in order to create wealth, jobs and more resilient economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Participants lamented the history of African economies\u2019 reliance on the export of raw materials. This economic phenomenon continues in many sectors today, including those closely related to global green transitions such as critical minerals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Other participants raised the question of whether African governments and people are ready for the negative impacts and immense upheaval that has historically come with industrial-led \u201cpollute first, clean up later\u201d development. Taking China as an example, one speaker pointed to the costs of environmental pollution and degradation. Addressing this has cost huge amounts of money, expertise and effort \u2013 and indeed has left many things lost forever. The social dislocation and disruption left by industrialisation was also mentioned. Traditionally, this is a process of moving land-tilling farmers into factories and other wage labour sectors, often with few rights, low pay and poor contracts. \u201cAre African governments and citizens prepared for this?\u201d the participant asked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Development is a complex process. One participant said many African nations think too narrowly about attracting foreign investment and short-term economic growth. A better approach, they suggested, is to enable long-term growth by raising knowledge and skills, as China and other East Asian economies have done so effectively. This led to discussion about knowledge and technology transfers in the China-Africa relationship. Such transfers are committed to in, for example, the 9th Forum on China Africa Cooperation\u2019s Beijing Action Plan<\/a>, the supposed blueprint for China-Africa relations through to 2027. To date, however, many projects initiated by Chinese investors rely on the expertise of Chinese engineers and planners, a source of tension in the relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In response to these issues, the discussion asked whether there might be other, cleaner ways to stimulate African industrialisation, manufacturing, economic development and knowledge upgrade and transfer. Innovation in emerging green technologies, such as electric vehicles and electronic equipment, was given as an example. In Kenya, both can benefit from the country\u2019s extremely clean power generation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A field trip to two Nairobi-based manufacturers offered some insight into how innovation, light manufacturing and leveraging relations with Chinese partners might offer pathways to economic development. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At Gearbox Europlacer, a Nairobi-based electronics manufacturer, Kenyan engineers design and assemble a wide range of equipment, such as solar-powered water-tank monitors for export to the Gambia and medical equipment to the UK. Many of the original components are imported from China, with platforms such as Alibaba providing the connection to Chinese suppliers. The facility benefits from Kenya\u2019s tax incentives for local production while investing in skills training.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The workshop participants also visited BasiGo, a pioneering electric bus company headquartered in Nairobi with a growing footprint in Rwanda. The startup partners with China\u2019s BYD to import electric bus components and assemble them in Kenya. There is regular knowledge exchange between BasiGo and BYD staff members, including visits by BasiGo staff to factories in China and a degree of knowledge transfer. With a 30% local content requirement set by Kenya\u2019s government, the assembly of buses also helps to stimulate some local industries such as glass and interior materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n BasiGo is helping to shift Nairobi\u2019s public-transport system away from diesel engines. With nearly 90% of Kenya\u2019s electricity generated by renewable sources, the new buses\u2019 carbon footprint is extremely low.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The startup plans to deploy 1,000 EVs across East Africa by 2027. Beyond that, the company hopes to expand manufacturing. \u201cThe goal isn\u2019t just to sell buses but to build an entire ecosystem with charging stations, trained mechanics, renewable-energy grids,\u201d said a senior company manager, who walked participants through one of BasiGo\u2019s Nairobi facilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, challenges like high import taxes on parts and unreliable electricity linger. This underlines a central paradox for African countries: while there is a desire to manufacture domestically, it is often cheaper to import directly, normally from China. How to balance the cost and economic-development incentives \u2013 and the short- and long-term horizons \u2013 is one of the most pressing policy challenges for African governments today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Through all of this, the conversation regularly circled back to the issue of corruption and state capture. Not as an abstract force, but as a major contributing factor to many African countries\u2019 poor infrastructure, lack of value addition to raw materials, and why foreign investors from China and elsewhere shrug off environmental laws. <\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cCorruption isn\u2019t just a problem,\u201d one governance expert in attendance said. \u201cIt\u2019s the single greatest threat to turning Africa\u2019s resources into public good.\u201d Staggeringly, over USD 1 trillion<\/a> has left Africa via illegal financial flows in the past two decades, they said, citing a figure calculated by the Thabo Mbeki-led High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This corruption directly contributes to poor decision-making around big-ticket infrastructure, mining and industrial projects. That leads to negative outcomes for local communities and replicates the extractivism that has shaped the relations of most African economies to the world, the expert continued.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Solutions proposed include stronger whistleblower protections, regional anti-corruption alliances, and contracts that tie investments to transparent local job quotas and value-added processing. As one participant bluntly put it: \u201cIf our leaders won\u2019t act in our interest, we\u2019ll keep being victims of every foreign investor\u2019s agenda.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n Additionally, participants saw a clear need to build up knowledge and understanding of how Chinese stakeholders in overseas investments operate, what their economic and political incentives are, and how to effectively engage with them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The workshop concluded with a public panel at the University of Nairobi, attended mostly by students. Audience questions focused on negotiating fair and mutually beneficial deals with Chinese stakeholders, job creation, and avoiding the so-called \u201cresource curse.\u201d Attendees were also curious about the lessons that might be drawn from China\u2019s development story and what opportunities exist for better engagement with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As emphasised during the workshop, there is a key role for African governments and other stakeholders to shape and drive Africa\u2019s engagement with China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u201cNegotiating with China \u2013 or any foreign investor \u2013 requires specialised skills \u2026 and political will,\u201d said one participant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n You may also be interested in the summaries of the other workshops in this series:\u00a0<\/strong> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Third of four workshops discusses the Africa-China relationship, economic development, innovation and corruption<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4106,"featured_media":60080032,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[758,757],"tags":[510,17073,50042156],"hashtags":[],"country":[20000110,50040759],"class_list":["post-60080018","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-business","category-energy","tag-china-in-the-world","tag-energy-transition","tag-overseas-investment","country-china","country-kenya"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"A](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/A-workshop-session-in-Narobi_Pasca-Chesach_Raoul-Wallenberg-Institute_IMG_6436-v2-scaled.jpeg\")
<\/div>Economic development <\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Witnessing African manufacturing<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
![\"A](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/05\/Participants-at-one-of-electric-bus-charging-and-repair-facilities_Pasca-Chesach_Raoul-Wallenberg-Institute_IMG_6604.jpeg\")
<\/div>Corruption<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Closing knowledge gaps on China\u2019s investments in Latin America<\/em><\/a>
Just transitions in the Mekong: China\u2019s role in trade and investment<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n