The SCO is a Eurasian political and economic alliance established in Shanghai in 2001. Back then it was formed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It has since grown to include India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
From an initial focus on regional security, the SCO has expanded its remit to development cooperation. At the recent SCO meetings in Tianjin, energy was positioned at the centre of the organisation\u2019s priorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
As well as its member states, the SCO also includes 2 observer states (Mongolia and Afghanistan) and 14 \u201cdialogue partners\u201d, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Egypt, Laos, Kuwait, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n
This represents a large increase on the 1 GW of solar and 0.3 GW of wind China has invested in SCO states since 2019. At the same time, tacit support was given to the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, which if built could push the Russian share of China\u2019s gas imports up to a third by the 2030s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So how will China\u2019s energy investments influence the energy transitions of SCO member states? And does China\u2019s cooperation with Central Asian countries and energy giant Russia signal a profound shift in the global energy landscape?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To answer these questions, Dialogue Earth spoke with experts from China, India, Pakistan and Finland.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lauri Myllyvirta<\/h2>\n\n\n\nSenior fellow at Asia Society Policy Institute and lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
China\u2019s recent pledge to develop 10 GW of wind and 10 GW of solar power projects across SCO countries represents a potentially important step forward in its overseas energy engagement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
![\"Lauri](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Lauri-Myllyvirta.jpg\")
<\/div>Chinese manufacturers have long dominated global solar power equipment supply, but the vast majority of the equipment is used in projects with no Chinese involvement in project development or financing. The pledge could serve as an opportunity for Chinese power companies and project developers to extend their presence beyond equipment exports. It could help them accelerate renewable-energy deployment abroad by drawing on the expertise they have built in scaling up clean energy at home.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At present, China\u2019s involvement in overseas clean energy remains largely confined to bidding for projects already included in host-country energy plans. The new pledge could create an opening for China to engage more deeply in dialogue with partner governments beyond discrete projects.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This dialogue could shape broader national energy planning by combining renewable generation with storage, transmission and equipment manufacturing. Such a shift would not only strengthen the position of Chinese developers internationally, but also help partner countries to raise their ambitions for renewable-energy deployment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Since 2019, China has invested<\/a> in 10.4 GW of solar and 7.6 GW of wind overseas. Within SCO countries, however, investment has been far more modest<\/a>, just 1.0 GW of solar and 0.3 GW of wind over the same period. This suggests both the relatively limited scale so far and the significant potential for Chinese investors to expand clean energy deployment in these markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2024, Pakistan imported<\/a> 17 GW of solar panels. India added<\/a> roughly 28 GW of wind and solar, and even Uzbekistan brought online<\/a> about 1.8 GW of solar. Given these countries\u2019 rapidly growing energy needs, a collective target of 10 GW each for solar and wind across all SCO countries over five years represents only a small fraction of their overall demand.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One caveat is that investing in Russia, a member of the SCO, while it continues its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine would carry serious reputational, diplomatic and ethical risks. Pursuing clean-energy cooperation in other SCO member states \u2013 many of which have pressing needs to diversify their energy mix, improve energy security and lower emissions \u2013 would both reinforce China\u2019s clean-energy leadership and demonstrate alignment with global climate goals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In sum, the 10+10 GW initiative can move Chinese overseas engagement from equipment export and project bidding toward systemic cooperation and energy planning. This way, it could meaningfully advance clean-energy transitions in SCO countries while strengthening China\u2019s role as a global clean-energy partner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The SCO summit saw new \u201cenergy and green-industry\u201d platforms announced and a new development bank floated. While these initiatives are still at an early stage, the more substantive progress is evident in gas pipeline projects and financial integration. These reflect China\u2019s long-term efforts to diversify and strengthen its position in global energy and finance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The revival of the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline is the clearest example. Gazprom\u2019s CEO said a memorandum of understanding (MoU) has been signed, though China has not confirmed this. The Chinese foreign ministry spoke only of \u201cactively promoting cross-border infrastructure and energy projects\u201d with Russia and Mongolia. No contract price, timeline or precise volume has been disclosed. Yet symbolism matters. Like Power of Siberia-1, which gained political momentum years before terms were finalised, the second iteration has shifted from stagnation to motion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If realised, it could deliver<\/a> <\/a>50 billion cubic metres annually and push Russia\u2019s share of China\u2019s gas imports to a third by the 2030s. For now, the pipeline is best read as a geopolitical signal rather than a commercial certainty. Whether it moves from MoU to reality will depend much on the terms China can extract and Moscow can accept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unlike in oil, where China has avoided heavy dependence on one supplier, in gas it appears willing to accept concentration because it delivers options in a world where the United States remains the largest liquid natural gas (LNG) exporter. Overland Russian supply could offer China a useful hedge against overreliance on US LNG and the Western financial architecture that underpins it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India, too, continues buying discounted Russian crude despite new US tariffs, as highlighted by the warm optics of Putin\u2019s recent meeting with Modi in China. The message is that China is not isolated. Others in Asia are also resisting US pressure. Pipelines, panda bonds, and LNG flows that sidestep Western pressure illustrate how China is aligning financial tools with energy ties to draw Russia deeper into its orbit, while India\u2019s continued purchases show it is not acting alone. The market impact may not be immediate, but the political signal is hard to miss.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Achieving the wind and solar power goals outlined in the SCO meetings will require a great deal of active collaboration across the entire industrial chain. This includes the manufacturing of wind and solar photovoltaic tech, and financing from Chinese investors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even as China\u2019s domestic wind and solar capacity booms, Chinese investors still face serious obstacles to invest in wind and solar projects abroad. They will require stronger policy support for implementation and insurance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In our work in Beijing, we have for years spoken to Chinese investors, enterprises and banks who express keen interest in wind and solar but are faced with a lack of effective financial mechanisms and limited risk coverage. Chinese investors looking at overseas wind and solar projects face limited financing structures, inflexible insurance guarantees, lengthy approval processes and a fragmented regulatory system not aligned with international technical standards. All this inhibits investments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 10+10 GW targets would involve the whole industry chain for wind and photovoltaic. The industrial strategy behind this agreement has of course received a lot of attention. But while much attention has gone to the strategic \u201coffloading\u201d function of such agreements for China\u2019s clean-tech industries, this particular agreement\u2019s inclusion of \u201ctechnology transfer\u201d and \u201cexperience exchange\u201d stands out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is an area that will be of strategic interest for member countries. Indeed, the member countries\u2019 response statements give greater emphasis to these elements. If effective technology transfer and experience exchange occurs between China and partners in the Global South, it could significantly support local-industry development from the ground up. Ultimately it could benefit regional energy structures and advance the energy transition both locally and globally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s participation in the SCO summit reflects a willingness to engage in energy cooperation, as China seeks to shape the forum into a platform for green-technology collaboration. For New Delhi, this engagement could indeed help streamline trade and knowledge sharing on green technologies. But it will remain cautious in order to protect its domestic supply-chain reforms. It will continue pursuing diversification to prevent falling into new dependencies. And it will emphasise ensuring that cooperation creates value within India through technology transfer, finance and joint research and development, rather than simply expanding import flows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Chinese solar photovoltaic modules have been crucial in driving India\u2019s installed solar capacity up to its current 120 GW<\/a>. Meanwhile, domestic manufacturing of solar panels has expanded<\/a> rapidly from 2.3 GW in 2014 to 100 GW by 2025. But India still depends<\/a> on China both for solar cells, which are the building blocks of solar panels, and for battery components. Though a Production Linked Incentive scheme has been launched<\/a> to support domestic battery-manufacturing capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, India\u2019s growing fossil-fuel imports need to be seen in the context of its broader energy transition. As the world\u2019s fastest-growing major economy, it needs to balance rising development-driven energy demand with supply security. Oil demand will continue to rise in the medium term, even as electrification gathers pace. There is no official climate target linked to reducing oil consumption. Instead, India\u2019s climate commitments focus on expanding renewable energy, reducing emissions intensity and reaching net zero by 2070. Higher oil imports today do not contradict its climate targets, as they are framed around reshaping the power mix and improving efficiency, largely by reducing reliance on coal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s influence in energy and climate discussions extends beyond its reliance on imports. Renewables already make up half<\/a> of its installed power capacity and it is targeting 365 GW of solar and 140 GW of wind by 2032. Electrification in transport, agriculture and domestic energy use is accelerating. At the same time, policies such as the Approved List of Models and Manufacturers<\/a> and the Production Linked Incentive schemes for solar, batteries and green hydrogen are trying to localise supply chains and reduce import dependence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Over the years, India has built a supportive policy environment for the energy transition. Competitive renewable auctions have consistently delivered some of the world\u2019s lowest tariffs, helping shape international price benchmarks and procurement models in other emerging economies. India also co-founded and leads the International Solar Alliance, now joined by over 120 countries, highlighting its role in shaping global clean-energy governance. Its advocacy in multilateral forums emphasises equitable, sustainable transitions for emerging economies. The SCO\u2019s 2025 declaration also recognised<\/a> India\u2019s global vision of \u201cOne Earth, One Family, One Future,\u201d reaffirming its leadership in promoting inclusive and sustainable development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This year\u2019s SCO summit drew unprecedented attention due to shifting global dynamics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The US has imposed heavy tariffs on China and India, and it is putting pressure on Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine, and pressure on India not to buy oil from Russia. SCO member states therefore began signalling interest in a parallel global system. China especially has felt the need for an alternative. This was also the first summit with both heads of state of India and Pakistan present since the recent military conflict between the countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India, frustrated by external interference, including Trump’s claims of mediation on Pakistan-India tensions, appeared to recalibrate its posture, hinting at openness to Chinese infrastructure support. China seized the moment, hosting the largest SCO summit to date, with 24 heads of state, and outlining expansive ambitions for the bloc beyond symbolic diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Climate cooperation emerged as a key theme. China proposed a new SCO development bank, and pledged CNY 2 billion in grants and CNY 10 billion in loans. Russia backed the multilateral approach, reinforcing a shared stance against hegemonism. However, despite the urgency, especially with Pakistan and India facing severe climate disasters, the summit lacked concrete mechanisms for joint climate action or immediate relief.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Pakistan, the summit signals a potential pivot. The approval of the SCO Development Strategy 2035 and of the proposed SCO development bank<\/a> offers alternatives to International Monetary Fund and World Bank financing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Aligning with SCO\u2019s broader development goals, Chinese and Pakistani leaders emphasised opening up new opportunities under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for industrial, agricultural, energy and digital cooperation. Pakistan\u2019s prime minister officially announced the launch of CPEC 2.0<\/a>. Further, the Second Pakistan-China B2B Investment Conference saw focus on not just electric vehicles, petrochemicals and iron and steel, but also health and agriculture.<\/p>\n\n\n\nXie Cheng Kai<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Schwarzman Academy associate at Chatham House<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"Xie](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Xie-Chengkai1.jpg\")
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Finance is the parallel frontier. According to the Financial Times, Chinese regulators told<\/a> Russian energy firms they can issue renminbi-denominated \u201cpanda bonds<\/a>\u201d in China\u2019s domestic market \u2013 the first such issuance since 2017. Coupled with the fact that more than 90% of bilateral trade already settles in rubles and renminbi, this deepens Moscow\u2019s dependence on China\u2019s financial system and provides a sanctions-resistant funding channel for pipelines and LNG logistics. It also advances Beijing\u2019s strategic goal of renminbi internationalisation, embedding energy security within financial sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\nLi Yuxiao<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Beijing-based project lead at Greenpeace East Asia<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Li-Yuxiao-scaled.jpg\")
<\/div>Ruchita Shah<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Energy analyst, Asia, at Ember<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"Ruchita](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/20250910_Ruchita-Shah-Ember.jpg\")
<\/div>Omais Abdur Rehman<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Senior associate at Renewables First, and lead coordinator at Pakistan Renewable Energy Coalition<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
![\"Omais](\"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/content\/uploads\/2025\/09\/Pakistan-expert.jpg\")
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