{"id":60110353,"date":"2025-12-16T16:29:40","date_gmt":"2025-12-16T16:29:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/?p=60110353"},"modified":"2026-01-05T15:53:59","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T15:53:59","slug":"what-is-chinas-contribution-to-climate-finance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/en\/business\/what-is-chinas-contribution-to-climate-finance\/","title":{"rendered":"What is China\u2019s contribution to climate finance?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The core questions raised at last month\u2019s COP30 climate conference in Bel\u00e9m, Brazil, were how to raise funds to support actions that address climate change in developing nations? And, once this climate finance is raised, how to allocate it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the conference reached no new breakthrough agreement. Countries instead decided to establish a two-year \u201cwork programme\u201d to discuss the climate finance issue, according to the Bel\u00e9m decision<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At COP29 in Azerbaijan\u2019s capital Baku last year, countries agreed to triple financing<\/a> for both mitigation and adaptation to climate change to a floor of USD 300 billion per year by 2035. It was decided that developed nations would be \u201ctaking the lead\u201d on supplying these funds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Countries also agreed in Baku to develop a roadmap on how to reach a more aspirational USD 1.3 trillion annually, also by 2035. The funds for this target would come from \u201call sources\u201d, meaning not just developed country governments but also private sources, multilateral development banks and other avenues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The subsequent Report on the Baku to Bel\u00e9m Roadmap to 1.3T<\/a> was presented at COP30. It proposes that half \u2013 USD 650 billion \u2013 comes from the private sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At a high-level COP30 meeting<\/a> on the roadmap witnessed by Dialogue Earth, Simon Stiell, executive secretary of the UN climate process, described the goal as \u201cachievable\u201d. He encouraged innovation in financial products, along with more involvement of private capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China finds itself in a complex position. Under the principle of \u201ccommon but differentiated responsibilities\u201d established for UN climate negotiations, it is not obliged to contribute to the USD 300 billion public finance pot due to its status as a developing country. But according to experts at COP30 who spoke to Dialogue Earth, overseas investments by Chinese companies are an important part of the route to the USD 1.3 trillion figure. China\u2019s clean tech economic boom has, in other words, marked it out from other developing countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In its climate transparency report published<\/a> last year, China complained that \u201cdeveloped countries emphasise global climate investment and financing, while downplaying their obligations to provide climate finance support.\u201d This illustrates that complex position. On the one hand, China highlights the obligation for developed nations to provide climate finance in the form of grants and concessional loans. Meanwhile, it is increasingly participating in climate finance via private investment channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, what is China\u2019s role in the Roadmap to 1.3T? And given the huge shortfall recently identified<\/a> in the UN Adaptation Gap Report, how does global climate funding need to change? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dialogue Earth spoke to experts from China and elsewhere to find out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Roadmap to 1.3T<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In November, the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance, which has informed the Paris Agreement\u2019s financial deliberations since COP26, issued a new report on how to provide the necessary climate finance to developing countries, excluding China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report says these countries will need USD 3.2 trillion<\/a> annually by 2035, if they are to continue developing while simultaneously avoiding the catastrophic impacts of climate change. About 60% of that \u2013 or USD 1.9 trillion \u2013 can be provided by developing nations themselves, says the group. This leaves USD 1.3 trillion to come from elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Roadmap to 1.3T report<\/a>, co-published in November by the COP29 and COP30 presidency teams, divides that up as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u25cf USD 300 billion in multilateral finance from development banks and climate funds
\u25cf USD 80 billion in bilateral concessional finance from developed countries
\u25cf USD 230 billion from new sources of low-cost finance, such as carbon markets, voluntary levies, debt swaps and private philanthropy
\u25cf USD 40 billion from South-South cooperation between developing nations
\u25cf USD 650 billion from cross-border private finance<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Achieving this will not be easy. According to a November analysis<\/a> by the World Resources Institute, the USD 300 billion in multilateral finance is achievable, but the real gap lies with the proposed USD 650 billion in private-sector money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Climate Policy Initiative, a think-tank headquartered in the US, has estimated that private, climate-related funding to developing nations excluding China stood at about USD 15 billion<\/a> in 2022. Foreign private investments into renewable energy in the least developed countries was only USD 16 billion<\/a> in that year, estimates UN Trade and Development. Raising that to USD 650 billion in the near term will clearly be challenging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s contribution<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This year, China has been relatively quiet about its contributions to climate funding. Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, told<\/a> the Guardian in Bel\u00e9m that China would provide more money to vulnerable countries. But he also said: \u201cWe don\u2019t want to take the lead alone. We need comprehensive leadership.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China has long aided climate mitigation and adaptation in developing nations via South-South cooperation \u2013 when developing countries work together to help one or both develop.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At COP29, China\u2019s vice premier Ding Xuexiang said<\/a>: \u201cSince 2016, China has provided and mobilised more than RMB 177 billion of project funds in support of other developing countries\u2019 climate response.\u201d But this total, which is about USD 25 billion at today\u2019s exchange rate, was not broken down by type of financing. The figure was given again<\/a> in early November in China\u2019s latest Paris Agreement action plan (officially known as its Nationally Determined Contribution).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The UN secretary-general, Ant\u00f3nio Guterres, and China\u2019s vice premier, Ding Xuexiang, at COP30 (Image: Kiara Worth<\/a> \/ UN Climate Change<\/a>, CC BY-NC-SA<\/a>)<\/div><\/div><\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n

\u201cFrom China\u2019s perspective, the new climate finance targets were already decided at last year\u2019s COP in Baku,\u201d says Kate Logan, director of the China Climate Hub and climate diplomacy for the Asia Society Policy Institute. \u201cThis year… there are no major negotiation topics that would put China’s own financial contributions in the spotlight. Instead, China has [joined] other developing countries in calling for developed countries to take greater responsibility for their climate finance commitments.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rebecca Nadin, director of global risks and resilience at ODI Global, a global affairs think-tank, agrees. She says China is positioning itself as a significant provider of climate finance to the developing world, partly in response to criticism from within the G77 group of developing countries. China has always stressed that its contributions are voluntary and distinct from those the developed nations have a duty to make.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cChina positions itself as a climate leader within the Global South but carefully maintains boundaries against developed-country burden-sharing expectations,\u201d she adds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China\u2019s contributions are not being officially tracked<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Research shows China\u2019s climate funding may go far beyond the figures detailed above, however.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The country contributed USD 3 billion a year in climate funding to developing nations between 2015 and 2021, via government bodies and policy banks, states a report<\/a> published this year by the think-tank E3G. However, things then started to change. For the first time, climate-related finance from commercial banks and companies overtook the amount provided via the government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Recommended<\/span><\/span><\/div><\/a>\n\n\n\n

In September this year, a report<\/a> from Johns Hopkins University in the US highlighted the impressive record of China\u2019s companies. Since 2011, they have signed up to investments of between USD 227-250 billion in overseas green-manufacturing projects. These include those that make batteries, solar and wind power components, electric vehicles and green hydrogen. The vast majority of that investment came between 2022 and 2024, with USD 210 billion committed across 54 countries. Three-quarters of it went to the Global South or emerging economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, there does not seem to be any official tracking of those figures. One of the report\u2019s co-authors is Mathias Larsen, a senior policy fellow at the London School of Economics’ Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. He said<\/a> in September that the Chinese government itself may not know the total. Although government bodies such as the Ministry of Commerce must approve investments, that is done at the project level. The government does not seem to be tracking or coordinating these huge overseas green investments, he added.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A new corporate-led model<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The other co-author of that report is Xue Xiaokang, an affiliate researcher at Johns Hopkins University’s Net-Zero Industrial Policy Lab. He tells Dialogue Earth that these private green investments are mainly motivated by profit: \u201cWe see three major motives: access to the host nation\u2019s market, access via the host nation to another country\u2019s market, and access to input materials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cChina\u2019s domestic subsidies [for renewable energy] and policy support are most likely of secondary importance in driving those overseas green investments.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report also points out that about half of participants in the investment surge since 2022 are solar or battery makers. Xue points to two factors behind this. Solar and electric vehicle manufacturers have now matured<\/a> and are operating at scale \u2013 they were ready to move overseas. Plus there is fierce competition<\/a> between them domestically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cWe regard this as a new model for China\u2019s climate governance. In the past, China\u2019s overseas climate finance was delivered through government-led channels, such as policy banks. Now, that process is business-led,\u201d Xue Xiaokang summarises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mathias Larsen describes the surge as a business-led \u201cBelt and Road 2.0\u201d, saying<\/a> China is not simply selling affordable low-carbon products overseas. Chinese companies are, with support from their host nations, involved in green transitions, he says. \u201cChina\u2019s total dominance of green tech… is globalising.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fikayo Akeredolu, who is undertaking a doctorate on Nigeria\u2019s energy transition at Oxford University in the United Kingdom, agrees: \u201cChina\u2019s leadership is industrial rather than ideological. It comes from scale, cost competitiveness, and long-term industrial policy rather than from setting the global rules of the transition. Other countries still influence standards, governance and finance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cBut on the technologies that matter most for rapid deployment, China is the key global player.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Next come two questions. For how long will large investment flows be maintained? And how to assess the contribution of those investments to climate targets? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Xue Xiaokang says the flow may have slowed in 2025, and in many cases project construction has only just started, so results are not visible yet. More research will be needed in the future to calculate how they have helped the climate targets of host nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Debt and adaptation<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

If low-carbon investments from Chinese firms are driving the energy transition in developing nations, what are the limitations or challenges of this market-driven model?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPrivate capital will not fund everything,\u201d said Avinash Persaud, the special advisor on climate change to the president of the Inter-American Development Bank, during a COP30 side event. Adaptation infrastructure such as flood defences are unlikely to win private investment, for example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Private investors prefer mitigation projects, mostly in renewable energy, as they are more likely to make a return on investment. That means less money for adaptation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lily Hartzell, senior policy advisor on E3G\u2019s public banking and development team, thinks appropriate financial instruments should be used for different project types. She believes grants are still vital for adaptation activities in low-income countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Another core challenge is debt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Two-thirds of low-income countries are in debt distress or at risk of it, according to a sustainability report<\/a> published by the UN in June. Yet in 2023, 59 least developed countries and small island developing states spent more on servicing debt than they received in climate finance. That is according<\/a> to the International Institute for Environment and Development, a think-tank headquartered in London.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cPrivate sector loans carry higher rates of interest, are shorter term, and cannot be compared with concessional loans. If low-income nations rely on commercial loans for public investment, they are under more pressure to make repayments and more likely to fall into a debt crisis,\u201d says Fikayo Akeredolu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cLoans themselves are not bad. They just need to be used very carefully,\u201d says Hartzell. \u201cCurrently, the most important thing is still to scale up available climate finance, since the funds flowing to developing countries are insufficient to meet their mitigation and adaptation needs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mathias Larsen, though, remains optimistic<\/a> about the surge in Chinese overseas investment seen in 2022-2024.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cThe crucial question is if and how the host country is able to make use of that opportunity.\u201d Some countries, Larsen says, have realised that importing cheaper products from China does not benefit local development or employment. \u201cTherefore, they put in tariffs and local content requirements to ensure that some parts of the value chains are inside the countries.\u201d Direct investment by Chinese firms, though, may help achieve industrialisation, employment and development targets, he adds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Avinash Persaud told Dialogue Earth at COP30: \u201cChina has the capacity to sell the developing world all the solar and wind. Today, politics gets in the way of something that would perhaps be one of the most powerful economic development strategies for both countries.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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