{"id":70516,"date":"2021-03-08T18:10:18","date_gmt":"2021-03-08T18:10:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinadialogue.net\/?p=70516"},"modified":"2023-03-29T13:49:07","modified_gmt":"2023-03-29T13:49:07","slug":"the-14th-five-year-plan-sends-mixed-message-about-chinas-near-term-climate-trajectory","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dialogue.earth\/en\/climate\/the-14th-five-year-plan-sends-mixed-message-about-chinas-near-term-climate-trajectory\/","title":{"rendered":"The 14th Five Year Plan sends mixed message about China\u2019s near-term climate trajectory"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

China last week released its 14th<\/sup> Five Year Plan (FYP), a top-level policy blueprint for the next five years that has been much anticipated since the country made its pledge in September last year to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The plan, for 2021-2025, was released in draft form for approval at the annual session of China\u2019s top legislature, the National People\u2019s Congress (NPC). Chinese media had expected a central place for carbon neutrality, but the 2060 goal was only mentioned once in the 148-page document. The climate-related targets for 2025 were also lower than expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet unlike the two previous FYPs the document does not set economic growth targets. Experts interviewed by China Dialogue welcomed this break from the growth-at-all-costs mentality, though they were disappointed that the plan only takes \u201cbaby steps\u201d towards decarbonisation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No growth target<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

China has been issuing FYPs since the 1950s. The policy targets laid down in these plans are considered the paramount indicators guiding China\u2019s economic and social development over the following five years. Strict top-down appraisals make sure the various bodies that make up the country\u2019s vast government apparatus meet the targets or face consequences. The draft FYP released on Friday is expected to be approved unchanged by the NPC on 11 March.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Uncertainties brought about by the ongoing pandemic and its economic impacts have overshadowed the drafting of the 14th<\/sup> FYP. Ahead of this year\u2019s NPC session, leading Chinese economists, including central banker Ma Jun<\/a>, suggested that no numerical GDP growth targets should be set out in the plan. Such targets, they argued, perpetuate an unsustainable debt-driven model of growth. With local governments keen to demonstrate their enthusiasm, China overshot its annual growth targets in both the 12th<\/sup> and the 13th<\/sup> FYP periods up to 2019, before Covid-19 hit \u2013 this was often achieved through investment in big projects financed by loans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The newly released draft reflects these concerns. Instead of setting annual GDP growth targets for the next five years, it lays out a new system of issuing \u201cindicative economic growth targets\u201d every year based on actual circumstances. For this year, GDP growth is expected to reach 6%, according to figures released at the NPC session.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Professor Zhu Dajian, director of Tongji University\u2019s Institute of Sustainable Development and Management, told China Dialogue that leaving out the economic growth target reflects China\u2019s commitment to development that is both high quality and low carbon. \u201cSix per cent for 2021 is a deliberately modest year-on-year target given last year\u2019s poor economic performance,\u201d he said. Due to Covid-19, China\u2019s GDP only grew by 2.3% in 2020.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lauri Myllyvirta, an analyst with the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), considers the absence of growth targets \u201cpotentially good news for the environment<\/a>,\u201d as \u201cit should give the government more flexibility to pursue other targets, and reduce the pressure to prop up GDP numbers at all costs.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

No definitive emissions trajectory<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

However, without GDP targets, it is difficult to assess the plan\u2019s impact on China\u2019s carbon emissions trajectory over the next five years, as its key climate targets are pegged to the performance of the Chinese economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ahead of the release, climate experts had called for the inclusion of a carbon emissions cap. But the draft does not contain one. Instead, it continues with the approaches of previous FYPs in setting energy intensity and carbon intensity targets per unit of GDP. By 2025, according to the new FYP, China is to reduce energy intensity by 13.5% from 2020 levels, and carbon intensity by 18%. The country will also boost the share of non-fossil sources in its energy mix to \u201caround 20%\u201d by the end of the period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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CREA\u2019s Myllyvirta calculates<\/a> that, on average, China\u2019s carbon dioxide emissions rose by 1.7% each year during the 13th<\/sup> FYP period (2016-2020). Despite low economic growth last year, emissions increased 1.5% year on year, approaching 10 billion tonnes in total. Assuming China\u2019s GDP grows at an annual rate of 5.5% from 2021 to 2025, carbon emissions will still rise by 1.1% each year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Last year, researchers at Tsinghua University\u2019s Institute for Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), who modelled China\u2019s roadmap to carbon neutrality by 2060<\/a>, projected that China could achieve a carbon emissions peak of around 10.5 billion tonnes shortly before 2030. This relied upon annual economic growth slowing to 5.3% during the 14th<\/sup> FYP period and 4.8% during the 15th<\/sup> FYP period, plus more aggressive carbon intensity cuts. Based on the results of this modelling, they recommended<\/a> setting a carbon intensity reduction target of above 19%, and an energy intensity reduction target of 14% in the 14th<\/sup> FYP.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since President Xi Jinping announced China\u2019s 2060 carbon neutrality goal at the UN General Assembly last year, many organisations and experts have called on the country to set more ambitious targets<\/a> to achieve peak carbon around 2025 instead of 2030. A recent study<\/a> by the World Resources Institute (WRI) argued that earlier peaking could be worth a net value of US$1 trillion in social and economic benefits for China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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But based on the targets in the 14th FYP, China has no plans to accelerate its actions on climate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

He Lifeng, director of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China\u2019s top economic planning agency, told reporters on Friday that the 14th<\/sup> FYP targets were created to be \u201chigh-hanging fruit\u201d \u2013 achievable, but only with effort. Yet many experts believe<\/a> that the targets will not be difficult to meet as long as China continues its current pace of renewables deployment and energy transition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dr Yang Fuqiang, a research fellow at Peking University\u2019s Research Institute for Energy, told China Dialogue that the plan\u2019s two intensity targets are lower than expected. \u201cIt\u2019s common for the government to set targets that leave a margin of error so that it can over-achieve rather than fail to meet them,\u201d he said. But he argued that China should change this mentality and use more ambitious targets to drive higher-quality development: \u201cIf the bars are set too low, they have less power to motivate.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Non-fossil sources of energy and coal<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As already outlined, the 14th<\/sup> FYP also contains a target for non-fossil fuels, which includes nuclear and hydropower, to make up around 20% of China\u2019s energy mix by 2025. The figure currently stands at about 16%. But unlike the last FYP, the energy mix is no longer in the \u201cbinding targets\u201d section. Instead, the 20% target was only included in the main text of the document. This difference may affect how the target is appraised by the central government. Binding targets are usually subject to more rigorous scrutiny.<\/p>\n\n\n\n