Chinese provinces have made clear progress on decarbonising power generation, but more limited progress on doing the same for energy use. The big challenge now and into the future is to get green electricity into factories, buildings, transport and urban operations.
This is the main conclusion from a report we published at the Beijing-based Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in June, after analysing the low-carbon transitions of 30 Chinese province-level administrations between 2013 and 2022.
Indeed, the new challenge is already reflected in provincial plans for 2026 to 2030 which we also reviewed. Many provinces have shifted the emphasis of their transition away from renewable energy capacity, greening the energy mix and exporting green power. Their focus is now on “end-use sectors” such as factories, buildings, transport, data centres, as well as encouraging consumption of low-carbon goods.
Although some provinces have added more coal power in the last few years – driven by economic pressures, extreme weather events and energy security concerns – we do not think this has changed China’s overall direction.
In the coming five years, the key to emissions reduction will be allowing provinces to take their own routes to end-use decarbonisation, in pursuit of China’s overall targets. Each province needs a transition roadmap suited to its own resource endowment, as we will see.
Decarbonising: From generation to consumption
The electricity sector had a clearer technological roadmap for decarbonisation than industry, buildings and transport, and policies there have changed faster.
Measures of power decarbonisation have long been part of national and provincial planning and auditing. Progress has been aided by the prominence of targets like renewables share of the energy mix, quantity of coal burned for power, and renewables consumption targets.
Last year was a landmark one for power’s low-carbon transition. The amount of wind and solar generating capacity installed overtook that of coal power for the first time and non-fossil energy sources accounted for 42.3% of all electricity generated. For the first time in a decade, coal power output fell, and all extra power demand was covered by new renewable capacity.
But decarbonising electricity generation is not the whole job. Can factories use green electricity? Can buildings use it for their heating and become more energy efficient? As road transport is decarbonised by electric vehicles, can rail, shipping and aviation follow suit?
There will be challenges. Emissions sources in these sectors are more scattered, defining and counting emissions more complex. Progress will require changes to industrial structure, infrastructure, urban governance and consumer behaviour.
This is why many provinces are shifting policy focus to “zero-carbon factories”, “zero-carbon zones” and the direct supply of green power, as they try to turn green electricity strengths into industrial competitiveness. Similar changes are being seen in the transport and building sectors.
Different places, different roadmaps
We found important differences across provinces in low-carbon transition outcomes and roadmaps.
In the east, places like Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Guangdong have actually done well on industrial structure, energy-efficient buildings and transport electrification. Carbon productivity – the amount of economic output per unit of carbon – is high, although local clean energy resources are limited. In those places, low-carbon pathways will involve importing green electricity, power trades, managing green supply chains, and end-use electrification.
Beijing, for example, has increased the amount of imported green power it uses; Jiangsu and Guangdong, meanwhile, are using the export-orientated manufacturing sectors to link industrial decarbonisation and export competitiveness with green power use.
The challenges in the energy-producing provinces of western China are different. Inner Mongolia, Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia all have ample renewable energy resources and plenty of land. There is huge potential here for decarbonising power, but carbon productivity lags behind the east. These places should not simply build wind and solar plants for green electricity exports. Such electricity should be converted into added value in the form of green hydrogen, green ammonia, green methanol, green computation, zero-carbon zones, and green power for manufacturing.
Provinces with large heavy industrial sectors face a bigger challenge. In the steel, coal-to-chemicals, metals and construction material sectors, the low-carbon transition doesn’t just mean an alternative source of energy. It requires a restructuring of the industrial system.
Shanxi needs to promote the use of green electricity in the production of metals and construction materials. Hebei, meanwhile, has to make deep emissions cuts in the steel sector. Inner Mongolia has to find new ways of linking the coal-to-chemicals and green building industries with its renewables production. The transition in places like this will require more than long-term technological investment. It must be guided both by financial support from government and market demand for low-carbon products.
Buildings and transport are also affected by local factors. Mega-cities like Beijing and Shanghai are emphasising energy-efficient retrofits of public buildings and more efficient data centres. In the north, places like Ningxia, Hebei and Jilin are continuing to move forward with clean heating, replacing coal use with electricity, and heating from air and ground source heat pumps. Hainan, with its tropical climate, will use more greenery to reduce the urban heat island effect and cut demand for air conditioning.
Cities are often warmer than the countryside that surrounds them due to a combination of factors: there are typically fewer trees to provide shade and cooling; a greater number of concrete and brick buildings, which can absorb heat; and more energy use, which produces waste heat. The result is known as the urban heat island effect.
On transport, Shandong and Shanxi are building “recharging corridors” for electric heavy trucks; while Jiangsu and Zhejiang are focusing on electrification and green electricity use in public service vehicle fleets.
As can be seen, what will be key is the selection of locally appropriate policies. This should be determined by available resources, end-use sector low-carbon demand and green industry opportunities.
Does more coal power mean the transition is changing direction?
Since 2022, extreme high temperatures, rapid growth in the demand for electricity, and energy security concerns have led some provinces to speed up coal power construction.
There is a risk to this: a power plant has to run for decades to earn back its cost and if the new plants run at full output all year round, higher emissions will result. But when renewables account for a large part of the energy mix, coal power may be shifted to back-up and system regulation roles.
In reviewing provincial plans for the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), we found 17 provinces, including Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, all mention a shift in the use of coal power towards energy security and system regulation purposes.
In Qinghai, coal power and other non-clean energy sources only account for 6.7% of the energy mix. The power type is set to help regulate a system of mostly renewables. A batch of coal power stations in Xinjiang are designated as back-up for electricity exports. Inner Mongolia needs to ensure green electricity exports and support national energy security, hence the emphasis there on the supportive role of coal power.
Things are somewhat different in the east. Zhejiang has limited energy sources, but high demand. There, high-efficiency coal power plants are being added as back-up for imports of green electricity. Tianjin, while controlling total coal consumption and coal power generation, is installing high-capacity, high-efficiency coal power units to ensure energy security and winter heating supply.
Twenty-six provinces, including Beijing, Hebei and Shanxi, say that all extra electricity demand will be met from clean sources of energy. Thirteen, including Hebei and Shanxi, said in their 2026 government work reports that 50% or more of their generating capacity was clean or renewable as of the end of 2025.
This means new electricity demand is not necessarily going to be met by coal, and that coal power generation will not automatically go up with the addition of coal power capacity. The extra coal power roll-out since 2022 does make policy coordination harder, but it does not change the overall direction the provinces are moving in.
Now, the provincial governments have to answer two questions. How will they ensure electricity supplies during periods of extreme weather and peak demand? And how will they avoid the new coal power capacity locking in high emissions? The success of the low-carbon transition will be affected not by the number of coal power plants built, but by the role they are given within the power system.
Accepting differences
In March 2021, China created a “1+N” policy framework. The “1” refers to a single central piece of policy guidance on meeting peak carbon and carbon neutrality targets. While the “N” means the various sectoral and local policies to be produced by ministries and provincial governments in response.
The 2026-2030 period will see an important change to this framework: a shift from energy consumption and intensity targets to carbon emissions and intensity targets. This will remove an obstacle to renewable energy development – that additional consumption would risk a province missing its energy consumption cap. It will also target carbon emissions more accurately.
The dual controls on carbon will be able to fully accommodate the “N” differences at provincial level. When allocating carbon emission and intensity targets in the first years of 2026-2030, overall consideration will be given to local development levels, regional functions and industrial and energy structure. That is according to a document on speeding up the new system.
At the same time, a unified national electricity market, trading of certificates that prove electricity has been generated renewably, the expansion of the carbon market, and inter-regional ultra-high-voltage transmissions lines will convert local differences into regional complementarities. The comparative advantages of different locations in energy supply, industrial division of labour and market linkage will complement each other and together support the national low-carbon transition.
The key to local low-carbon transitions is cutting emission via tailored routes. Decarbonisation continues in the power sector, with local policies spreading that progress into end-use sectors. Next, the speed and depth of the end-use transition will determine the success of the dual carbon targets and the quality of economic and social development.
