On 23 April, India announced it would suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a landmark water-sharing agreement with Pakistan signed in 1960. The move marked a significant escalation in South Asia’s already fraught transboundary water diplomacy. Two weeks later, on 6 May, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reiterated India’s hardline stance: “Now, India’s water will flow for India’s benefit, it will be conserved for India’s benefit and it will be used for India’s progress.”
The announcements followed a deadly terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on 22 April that killed 26 and left 17 injured. India has blamed the attack on Pakistan, which has denied involvement. In response, India carried out what it called “precision strikes” across nine targets, which it described as “terrorist camps” in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the early hours of 7 May. The next day, both countries engaged in cross-border drone strikes, signalling a further deterioration in bilateral ties. India’s abeyance of the IWT is part of this broader response.
Brokered by the World Bank, the treaty governs the use of the Indus River system. It allocates the three eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas, Sutlej – to India, and the three western rivers – Indus, Jhelum, Chenab – to Pakistan. While experts note that India cannot legally divert water from the western rivers under the treaty, recent actions suggest it is testing the limits of the agreement.
On 1 May, India initiated a sediment-flushing operation at the Baglihar and Salal hydroelectric dams on the Chenab – an activity typically conducted in August – without prior notice to Pakistan. Then, on 4 May, it closed the dams’ sluice gates, significantly restricting downstream flows and raising concerns in Pakistan. India is also planning further restrictions at the Kishanganga Dam on the Jhelum. The World Bank, meanwhile, has said its role is limited to facilitation of the treaty rather than enforcement.
At the same time, Reuters reported that India has accelerated construction of hydropower projects on the Chenab, including the Pakal Dul, Kiru, Kwar and Ratle projects – developments with geopolitical and ecological implications.
While the treaty permits run-of-river projects with limited storage, the 1,000-megawatt Pakal Dul project, which includes a reservoir, is set to become the largest hydropower project in Jammu and Kashmir, which Pakistan has previously objected to.
Experts caution that these projects could trigger ecological and environmental disasters. Himanshu Thakkar, a water expert and coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People, says that every major intervention in this highly vulnerable, fragile and disaster-prone area invites more risks, including increased intensity, frequency and reach, along with displacement and deforestation. “Climate change adds another layer of uncertainty and disasters,” he says. Thakkar also adds that India’s fast-tracked projects often lack proper groundwork: “There is a lack of sufficient homework on geological aspects, early warning systems and landslide-proneness. Accelerating without doing the homework will invite more trouble.”
India’s actions also ripple across the broader region. About 74% of South Asia’s population is exposed to high water stress, with much of the region dependent on hydrological data-sharing – one of the obligations under the treaty. Like Pakistan, Bangladesh has long relied on India’s cooperation for timely water data and equitable flows for the Ganges and Teesta rivers, says Ashok Swain, Unesco chair of international water cooperation and professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University in Sweden. He warns that India’s shift could undermine regional cooperation.
When we weaponise water and a river, what exactly are we doing? Who suffers? Innocent peopleHimanshu Thakkar, water expert and coordinator of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People
Similar concerns have been expressed by Bangladeshi water experts. Aninun Nishat, a water and climate expert from Dhaka, told The Hindu that the move may jeopardise renewal of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty, which expires next year. “If India continues to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, then it will create doubts about India’s willingness to share river waters with Bangladesh,” he said. Critics might argue that “India’s assurances on the Ganga equally have no value”, Nishat added.
Swain says this could push Bangladesh to strengthen water cooperation with China through investments in water infrastructure. “This will reduce India’s regional influence and deepen China’s strategic footprint in its backyard,” he notes.
Thakkar agrees, noting that this may lead China to expand its involvement in South Asia, particularly in infrastructure projects which may influence regional partnerships and shift geopolitical dynamics, especially in countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. However, he believes that the “purely commercial, contractual point of view” of China could mean it will not be a good deal for such countries. Thakkar cites the Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project in Pakistan as an example. In 2022, Chinese firms halted operations and repair of the 969-megawatt project due to protests and payment disputes.
Nepal, too, may reassess its treaties with India. Swain notes: “Already wary of being the junior partner in past treaties, Kathmandu could be tempted further to explore alternative partnerships with China or adopt a more transactional approach to hydropower deals with India.”
Thakkar, however, points out that Nepal’s options are limited. “For Nepal, the only market for excess electricity is India. And India has made it clear that it will not buy power from projects in which the Chinese are involved.”
Swain notes that there are also strategic risks from the north. In 2024, China approved the construction of the world’s largest hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (which becomes the Brahmaputra in India). Swain highlights the complexities surrounding China’s plans, and notes that unlike India’s extensive bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, China has no formal water-sharing arrangements with India or its other neighbours. He adds that, at a time when India is signalling a willingness to use water as strategic leverage, “China, which already has a record of withholding hydrological data during critical periods such as the 2017 Doklam standoff, may take a similar approach.”
But China faces significant challenges too. “The geology, meteorology and climate are very fragile there,” notes Thakkar. He adds that while fears of Chinese water dominance are real, they are often used to justify India’s own hydropower ambitions. Instead of relying on uncertain bilateral data, Thakkar suggests India invests in satellite monitoring to assess upstream activities.
Considering China’s deepening ties with Pakistan and its involvement in large hydropower projects, the dynamics around water security in South Asia are becoming more complex. Swain notes that while India’s decision to unilaterally suspend the Indus Waters Treaty may seem like a tactical response to Pakistan’s provocations, it risks setting a precedent that could unravel the fragile fabric of regional water cooperation both in the wider region and at home.
“If India’s northern water systems come under pressure due to upstream Chinese projects, its ability to ensure water security in the northeastern states could be severely compromised. The already tense conditions in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam could be exacerbated by ecological disruptions and data blackouts,” he says.
“If India, long seen as a status-quo power in transboundary water governance, begins treating water as a strategic weapon, it opens the door for other states to follow suit.”
Both Thakkar and Swain emphasise that using transboundary rivers as tools of coercion will affect India’s credibility among neighbouring states. Swain also notes that it might also invite retaliatory measures that could erode its standing in the region and globally. “For a country that seeks leadership in climate diplomacy and South-South cooperation, this path carries strategic costs that far outweigh any tactical gains.”
Thakkar concludes on a human note: beyond geopolitical costs, there are significant human impacts.
“When we weaponise water and a river, what exactly are we doing? Who suffers? Innocent people.”
