For many, the race for South America’s lithium is still seen as just another chapter in the energy transition: from Andean salt flats to batteries, and into Tesla or BYD electric cars. This understanding is increasingly incomplete.
Critical minerals, such as lithium, cobalt, nickel and copper, are generally understood as being vital to both the energy transition and the security of global supply chains. Increasingly, however, these same materials are also key inputs for advanced defence systems, surveillance satellites and the data centres that underpin artificial intelligence infrastructure.
Argentina has significant reserves of several of these minerals. Mostly lithium, but also copper in the provinces of Catamarca and San Juan. The scarcity and importance of these resources give Argentina an opportunity to seize sovereignty over its own development. That opportunity is being missed.
Sovereignty lost
Being in possession of scarce resources does not guarantee that the power rests with the producer. To take advantage, the producing state needs to know who controls the deposits and the final destination of what is extracted. The producer also requires enough capacity to set the conditions for the use of its natural resources. Without these three elements, others will be enriched while the producer stays subordinate.
Argentina fulfils none of these three criteria. As per the constitutional reform of 1994, the state grants each province ownership over the natural resources within its territory. The result is a patchwork of rules. There are currently 66 lithium projects at various stages of development, concentrated across the northern provinces of Catamarca, Salta and Jujuy. Each is regulated, monitored and reported on according to its own criteria.
There is no national authority capable of consolidating this information, or of tracking what percentage of each shipment of lithium carbonate ends up in a car battery, a military drone or a data centre’s backup system. Without a major reform of the current regulatory framework, all the signs suggest the same will happen with the rest of the minerals classified as “strategic” in Argentina’s subsoil.
The sovereignty at stake is not merely a question of who receives the mining revenue, but of who decides what the extracted resources are used for. And in this regard, Argentina – both as a state and as a civil society – is ill equipped.
Argentina stuck between superpowers
These projects are progressing in an environment in which the impetus for critical minerals funding internationally has shifted from decarbonisation to arms and technological dominance. For example, the US has become increasingly concerned with critical minerals, with a barely concealed focus on defence.
The US Department of Defense purchased a 15% stake in the Las Vegas-based critical minerals company MP Materials in July 2025, becoming the company’s largest shareholder. The country has announced its intention to create a strategic critical minerals reserve worth USD 12 billion.
These minerals are not just for the energy transition anymore.
Argentina is experiencing this tension in a particularly acute way. In February, the government signed a critical minerals agreement with Washington, under which the country commits to prioritising the US in the supply of lithium, copper and other minerals, both in raw and processed forms.
The agreement forms part of a broader US strategy to reduce its dependence on China, which controls around 75% of the global market for these resources.
Due to its systemic macroeconomic weakness, the country has found itself caught in this geopolitical dispute without the mechanisms to capitalise on its position
But on the ground, the picture is quite different. Around 70% of Argentina’s lithium production is ultimately destined for China. In May this year, the government approved the expansion of a lithium project in which Ganfeng, China’s largest lithium mining company, is the majority shareholder with a 47% stake.
This is the structural consequence of Argentina lacking its own policy. It aligns itself rhetorically and diplomatically with Washington, whilst the largest-scale investments on the ground are funded by Chinese capital with the spoils flowing in China’s direction.
Due to its systemic macroeconomic weakness, the country has found itself caught in this geopolitical dispute without the mechanisms to capitalise on its position. This vulnerability deepens decades of unrestricted openness to foreign capital in the mining sector. The system forgoes local supplier requirements for materials, traceability, and any thought to developing and growing the domestic minerals industry beyond raw extraction.
Rapid growth
In 2025, Argentina’s lithium carbonate production exceeded 110,000 tonnes, a historic record. Mining exports reached USD 6 billion, almost 30% more than in 2024. Argentina is seeking to attract foreign investment, and the mining sector already accounts for more than half of the nearly 95,000 million dollars’ worth of investment projects submitted to the RIGI, the incentive scheme for major investments approved in 2024.
The International Energy Agency projects that global demand for lithium will increase ninefold by 2040, if humanity pursues accelerated decarbonisation. However, this demand is accompanied by a growing dispute amongst major powers over supply chains, which no longer distinguishes between civilian and military uses of the mineral.
The Argentine Mining Code dates back to 1886. The framework for provincial control over natural resources was consolidated in 1994. Both were designed to attract capital to regions lacking infrastructure, based on a model of export-oriented integration with no added value and no conditions regarding where extracted goods ultimately go. These tools are insufficient for managing 21st century geopolitical disputes over critical minerals.
Weak regulations and traceability, and an overt openness to foreign capital risk repeating the mistakes of previous resource booms that left suppliers vulnerable and underdeveloped.
Argentina must urgently initiate a debate on the ownership, traceability and strategic alignment of its critical resources. Otherwise, global powers and private consortia will, by default, determine which wars, which servers and which technological empires ultimately consume its salt flats.
