Climate

Q&A: How host countries can strike better deals with cleantech manufacturers

Tim Sahay is trying to create a race to the top for standards that host countries impose on foreign investors such as China
<p>&#8220;We are now seeing the benefits of acting on climate in the form of local jobs, local profits, local political interests, local labour unions,&#8221; says Tim Sahay (Image: Ahmed Gomaa / Xinhua / Alamy)</p>

“We are now seeing the benefits of acting on climate in the form of local jobs, local profits, local political interests, local labour unions,” says Tim Sahay (Image: Ahmed Gomaa / Xinhua / Alamy)

China’s green technologies have become a modern obsession. But solar panels, wind turbines and batteries are not the only things moving around the world from China. The factories that make them are spreading too.

As China’s domestic market has become saturated and new trade barriers limit direct access to key markets, businesses have looked overseas for opportunities and taken their manufacturing with them. This is reshaping not just local economies but also national industrial strategies and global climate policies.

Tim Sahay, co-director of the Net Zero Industrial Policy Lab at Johns Hopkins University in the United States, has been following this money with his colleagues. They have built a database that tracks trends in global clean technology investment since 1996.

Sahay tells Dialogue Earth why the Cleantech Manufacturing Foreign Direct Investment database is important. Understanding what drives investment can help countries make better choices as they try to transition away from fossil fuels, he explains.

The interview has been edited for length and clarity.

Dialogue Earth: Could you describe what you did for this work?

Tim Sahay: We tracked every single solar manufacturing plant, wind manufacturing plant, battery manufacturing plant, and EV manufacturing plant that is owned by a foreigner. 

There’s a lot of factories being built, but people don’t know quite where. They don’t know how much capital is being invested, by whom, in what places, and why. There’s over 1,000 such FDI factories, adding up to about USD 435 billion in pledged capital in 66 destination countries.

And people have a vague sense that well, China is the leader, but they don’t know precisely when China became the leader or which countries are attracting Chinese firms to build their own cleantech manufacturing base.

These are all important questions for the future of climate politics, for the future of climate and development, for how industries get social licence to operate in different parts of the world. They matter for this clean technological revolution that is reshaping not just every country’s electricity and factories but also ownership, profits and control.

And you found this huge leap in investment after 2017?

Yes, and that is the most staggering finding, the scale of this build out after 2017.

Before 2017, there used to be green FDI. But it was built by the winners of the 20th-century manufacturing world. The Japanese, Germans, Americans were building plants overseas in other countries, but it was just a handful – of the order of a few billion dollars a year.

The green component of overall global FDI used to be about 2% before 2017. Since then, it has become 20%

And what happens after 2017 is immense change in the amount of plants being built overseas. In our data set, we are tracking over 650 plants that have been built just in the last five years alone, with a surge especially in battery and EV factories.

Whenever you have big numbers like these, you want to know as a share of what? And what we found is the green component of overall global FDI used to be about 2% before 2017. Since then, it has become 20% of all of the manufacturing activity happening overseas.

And who is behind that massive jump? Is it mainly driven by Chinese FDI?

First, in the early 2010s, it was the US, Japan and Germany. China passing its big industrial policies in 2015 – the Made in China policy – really focused and honed in on batteries and EVs in particular.

When we get to the 2020s and during the pandemic, China puts in another enormous surge of investment into solar, wind, EVs, and batteries, and you get this enormous domestic industrial boom inside China. By 2022, those same companies are now leaping out and building factories outside the country.

China ends up becoming about 40% of our dataset, which is about USD 130 billion of investment outside China.

And what is motivating where in the world investments go?

There are three big buckets of motivations for firms to build plants outside their home country.

The first is they are attracted to large consumer markets. That’s exemplified by the United States becoming the largest destination of foreign-owned factories. But it’s also true for large developing countries like Brazil or India that are receiving a lot of factories.

The second big reason is third-market access, if that destination country has an existing trade relationship with the United States or Europe in the form of a free-trade agreement. Morocco, Korea, Oman. Those factories are not being built to sell an EV or a battery to Moroccans. Morocco is a production base, an export base to access the European market or the American market.

The third one is companies want to be close to raw materials. And if a country has raw material power – which many developing countries do have – then they can basically tell foreign investors “we are not going to give you access to our raw mineral ores, unless you build us a processing factory”. That is exemplified by Indonesia, which has bargained its vast nickel reserves in exchange for battery factories and nickel-processing facilities, again from the Chinese and the Koreans.

Lastly, there is the industrial policy of host countries themselves, who are trying to attract these foreign companies to set up shop with attractive subsidies in order to meet their own climate and development goals.

You said the database will help people see what kind of deals are being struck. How can they use that information?

One of our primary reasons was a benchmarking so that countries can avoid a race to the bottom, and instead have a race to the top in terms of standards that they impose on foreign investors in return for subsidies.

You can have very extractive outcomes, where there’s very few local jobs being created, environmental standards are not met, labour standards are not met. Essentially the companies get a free pass, a special economic zone or an industrial park, and they do precious little for the country’s own development or its own workers or its environment. That’s a race to the bottom.

The developmentalist outcome is a race to the top outcome, where countries compare what companies are doing, and what standards are being set by other countries, and benchmark themselves against them.

Is there an example of how that can work?

Spain versus Hungary.

CATL, the largest battery manufacturer in the world, built up a factory in Spain that is a 50-50 joint venture with a European automaker, Stellantis. The Spanish were able to negotiate their subsidies in return for requirements on technology transfer, domestic workers, R&D in Spain, and local firms’ participation in the supply chain.

The Hungarians under Viktor Orbán essentially created a special economic zone, absolutely a race to the bottom, to attract CATL and Korean battery manufacturer Samsung. They essentially said you can do whatever you want with very low environmental standards, which provoked an enormous social protest movement in Hungary.

Knowing what the same company, CATL, is doing in two different places is important. What I would want is our database to be used by development planners, industrial policymakers, unions, environmental advocates, to hold these companies to account and to hold their governments to account.

What do you think the investment that you’re seeing means for our ability to combat climate change?

It is unambiguously good that more and more countries are now participating in a global green industrial buildout, making climate and development, climate and prosperity work together instead of against each other. That creates powerful political coalitions inside countries that want to go green and act on climate.

And we are now also seeing the benefits of acting on climate in the form of local jobs, local profits, local political interests, local labour unions. And so that is entrenching climate in the politics of countries and in their development and growth models, which is just unambiguously good.

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