China’s new coal plan emphasises energy security and the “green and low-carbon transition” of the sector, but has no clear timeline for peaking or reducing coal consumption.
The plan was released on 10 August as the sector enters a critical period of transition, with China having pledged to peak its CO2 emissions before 2030.
Will the plan’s strategy to continue phasing out smaller mines and consolidating production in major bases, reduce overall coal use? Is the role of coal in China shifting from fuel to feedstock for the coal-to-chemicals sector?
To explore this and other issues, Dialogue Earth interviewed Chinese and international experts who had differing takes on the plan’s implications.
Some believe the 15th Five Year Plan for the Development of the Coal Industry (2026-2030) seeks to stabilise coal consumption through 2030 rather than actively reducing it. They also expressed concern about the continued emphasis it places on developing coal-to-chemicals. Others believe China’s coal consumption may have already peaked, or will peak this year.
Their remarks have been edited for length and clarity.
‘I believe coal consumption will peak between 2025 and 2026’
Yang Fuqiang, senior advisor, Climate Change and Energy Transition Program, Institute of Energy, Peking University
This plan addresses the future direction of the coal industry amidst a slowdown in coal consumption and the requirement to reach a consumption peak during the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030).
I believe coal consumption will peak between 2025 and 2026 as this is essential to laying a solid foundation for reaching the national CO2 peak before 2030.
China’s total coal consumption in 2025 will remain roughly flat compared to 2024, with minimal growth. Meanwhile, coal imports have already begun to decline. China typically imports over 400 million tons of coal from Indonesia, but that is expected to fall this year. Looking ahead, China reaching its coal consumption peak will significantly impact the international coal market.
The declining consumption is due to less usage in key industrial sectors. The slump in the real estate market has, for instance, led to lower coal consumption in the steel industry. There has also been less coal burned for heating in homes.
Further reductions will rely on bringing coal consumption for power generation to a peak as soon as possible and implementing total consumption controls in the coal-to-chemicals industry.
Some external observers question whether the plan reflects a shift in coal’s role – specifically, an acceleration of the coal-to-chemicals industry. Given the rapid growth of this sector in recent years, I believe implementing total consumption controls is necessary.
Several factors must be considered. How many coal-to-chemicals projects should China actually launch? And the industry faces serious pollution issues, particularly the challenge of treating wastewater, waste gas and solid waste.
Currently, it’s the only sector where coal consumption is still rising. That said, the high concentration of CO2 in its emissions makes capture and subsequent use for producing hydrogen, ammonia and methanol feasible. And there have been significant advancements in waste-treatment technologies.
The plan does not specify a timeline for coal consumption to peak. On the one hand, it is difficult for policymakers to set a precise date, as this depends on coal consumption levels in 2026. On the other, the central government aims to maintain some flexibility to avoid triggering panic in the volatile coal market. Nevertheless, coal consumption is set to peak during the 15th Five Year Plan period.
‘The plan reflects the new policy of stabilising coal consumption’
Lauri Myllyvirta, co-founder, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air
The big picture on coal is that China’s planners are aiming to stabilise consumption by 2030, allowing for an increase in the early years of the plan period, instead of the earlier commitment to gradually reduce coal consumption during the 2026-30 period. Consumption in the power sector and coal-to-chemicals sector is even allowed to keep growing past the targeted emission peak.
In this context, the coal industry five-year plan creates stronger tools to control coal mining capacity and coal mine output, but doesn’t set any goals to actually reduce output or capacity.
Maintaining coal output requires new investment to replace or expand deposits and pits that have been exhausted, and the plan allows for this. The aim is centralisation and consolidation of both coal production and consumption, just as it has been in past five-year plans. Restrictions on new and expanded mines only apply to mines below specified size thresholds, so they are not aimed to limit overall mine capacity but to concentrate it in larger units.
The “reserve production capacity” refers to the ability of mines to ramp up output. The aim of this and the unified national coal mine ledger (产能一体帐) is to manage the supply-demand balance and stabilise prices.
The plan’s measures to better organise and manage China’s coal mining industry are of course relevant also when coal consumption begins to fall.
The plan would definitely look different if the earlier commitment to “gradually reduce coal consumption” was taken into account. If there was a clear commitment to reduce consumption, then balancing demand and supply and avoiding stranded assets and oversupply would require stronger measures to phase down coal mining capacity. The plan’s emphasis on controlling and managing but not reducing coal mining capacity reflects the new policy of stabilising consumption.
The contradiction that remains is that slowing energy demand growth and continued rapid expansion of clean energy capacity are likely to lead to a sustained fall in coal consumption in the coming years. The coal industry plan gives policymakers some tools to avoid overcapacity and stranded assets in this scenario, if they choose to use them.
‘Restrictions on new and expanded coal mines are a positive signal’
Gao Yuhe, Greenpeace East Asia, Beijing-based project lead
The plan signals a gradual restructuring of China’s coal industry, but it does not yet provide a sufficiently clear pathway to reduce coal consumption and phase out coal power.
It’s increasingly clear that energy security will be better delivered through renewables, energy storage and a more flexible power system.
The plan does not set a target year or quantity for China to peak coal consumption, nor establish an overall cap on coal consumption. That absence leaves considerable uncertainty about the pace and scale of China’s transition away from coal.
China’s power sector already peaked its emissions in 2025, so coal consumption should not wait until 2030 to peak. Coal is primarily used to generate electricity in China, and no new coal power is needed to meet electricity demand. Beijing should therefore bring forward the coal peak by setting a clear timetable to phase out coal power.
At the same time, the plan suggests that coal production will become increasingly concentrated in a few large resource-rich bases, particularly in northern and western China. The restrictions on new and expanded coal mines are a positive signal, but they may have a limited impact on overall coal capacity.
More importantly, controlling coal production capacity alone does not guarantee a decline in coal consumption, particularly if existing mines continue to be exploited at or near full capacity, or if new coal demand is created through coal power and other coal-intensive industries.
China needs to translate its broader commitments to control coal consumption and coal power capacity and generation into concrete and sufficiently ambitious targets.
‘New energy substitution and methane emission control are regarded as important breakthroughs for carbon reduction’
Yuan Jin, environmental science professor, Taiyuan University of Technology
The plan’s biggest highlight is that the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry has officially entered a new stage of “systematic advancement of the entire life cycle” from “partial transformation”.
In the past, ecological and environmental protection was always regarded as a passive external constraint and an “end management” that increased corporate costs. Now, it is being transformed into a driving force within industry to improve quality and efficiency.
The plan clearly points out that green requirements should be implemented throughout the entire process from exploration, design, construction, production to mine closure. For example, solid coal mining waste and mine water treatment are shifting from meeting the terminal storage and emission standard, to source reduction and diversified utilisation.
At the same time, new energy substitution and methane emission control are regarded as important breakthroughs for carbon reduction. For coal companies, systematic carbon reduction and ecological governance are no longer just compliance burdens, but a key path to optimising cost structures, cultivating new businesses and improving development resilience.
Many people see it as a contradiction that the plan mentions “coordinat[ing] the closure and exit of coal mines” while also taking into account “regional supply security”. From the perspective of sustainable development, this contradiction is actually very normal. For a long time, the habitual thinking of China’s coal industry has been to “get bigger and stronger” and maintain scale growth. Now, for the first time, it is faced with a plan to prepare for coal peaking, and the industry needs an adaptation process. This not only requires “establishment” – building advanced production capacity clusters in the five major bases to stabilise the basic market – but also “breakdown” – closing outdated production capacity and coal mines in ecologically sensitive areas.
The plan’s restrictions on new construction and expansion have, in fact, fully taken into account the differences in regional resource endowments and ecological carrying capacity, with regionally tailored approaches. While outdated small production capacity is being eliminated, a number of successive large mines are under construction in the five major bases. This is essentially a steady optimisation of the national production capacity structure and will not have a major impact on the overall supply.
As for the goal of “building a production capacity reserve of more than 100 million tons per year by 2030”, I think it is relatively easy to achieve. As macro demand enters a downward trend, relying on large coal mines to establish elastic reserves is mainly to improve emergency support and “emergency conversion” capabilities under extreme conditions.
The plan does not set a specific peak year and total cap. I believe there are no absolute figures mainly because in the short term, affected by objective factors such as extreme weather and fluctuations in renewable energy output, coal demand will inevitably fluctuate slightly before and after peaking. Policies need to retain the necessary adjustment flexibility for the energy system. This does not mean that the goal has wavered. Promoting coal consumption to peak is not only a clear policy direction, but also an objective trend for China’s energy transformation and sustainable development.
