Jennifer Morgan: China’s next chapter in climate diplomacy will shape global action for years

As COP31 approaches, China’s role in global climate diplomacy is again in focus. It has evolved over the past three decades from defensive participant to proactive protagonist, and the signs are that it will continue changing, with China now casting itself as a “torchbearer” for global climate action. Understanding this change will be key to ensuring effective and just outcomes from climate negotiations for years to come.

For those present during the early negotiations surrounding the Kyoto Protocol in the mid-1990s, the impassioned interventions of figures like Professor Zhong Shukong remain unforgettable. “In the developed world, only two people ride in a car, and yet you want us to give up riding in a bus,” he said, insisting that China was, and would remain, a developing country. Zhong argued for a distinction between “survival emissions” and “luxury emissions”.

Why Jennifer Morgan? She has spent more than three decades at the heart of international climate policy, diplomacy and advocacy. Morgan was executive director of Greenpeace International and previously led global climate programmes at the World Resources Institute, E3G and WWF. More recently, as Germany’s state secretary and special envoy for international climate action, she helped shape the country’s climate foreign policy. Now a senior fellow at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Morgan brings a rare perspective spanning civil society and government. That makes her particularly well placed to examine China’s transformation from a defensive negotiator into a global clean energy powerhouse, and ask what it would take for Beijing to become a genuine international climate leader.

Back then, China’s per capita emissions were one-tenth those of the United States. Preserving developing country status was a non-negotiable priority for Beijing. Crucially, it saw all efforts around targets or commitments for China as attempts to limit the nation’s economic growth. As a result, it approached climate diplomacy defensively.

While China continues to work within its negotiating block G77+China, the nature and visibility of its international engagement have undergone a profound transformation.

How we got here: from defensive participant to pragmatic protagonist

From the mid-2000s, a shift was occurring inside China. Growing understanding of the threat posed by climate change to the county’s agricultural yields and food security elevated the issue to a concern of national interest.

External factors also played a role. After the turbulent 2009 Copenhagen climate summit (COP15), when western leaders placed blame on Beijing for the lack of an ambitious outcome, China shifted gears. Retreating from the immediate spotlight, it defended its national interests through quieter, background diplomacy within the G77 that avoided dominating global headlines.

After COP15’s failure, China, traditionally an advocate of multilateral systems grounded in equity, recognised that multilateralism itself was at a critical nexus, and stepped forward. In a landmark move, Beijing engaged directly with the world’s largest historical emitter, the United States, to forge a joint bilateral declaration in 2014.

This leveraging of a high-profile bilateral format in service of a multilateral framework positioned China in a more proactive and constructive light. It also demonstrated the seriousness of the Obama Administration. President Xi Jinping announced China’s targets as part of the US-China statement when President Obama visited Beijing.

The more pragmatic stance continued in the negotiations themselves. The highly experienced statesman Xie Zhenhua was appointed in 2015 as special representative for climate change affairs. He led the Chinese delegation in the Paris climate negotiations (COP21). While staunchly defending developing-nation equity, Xie used informal bilateral channels to build trust and bridge deep divides.

New opportunities and responsibilities

But to understand China’s evolution, one needs to focus on its own economic and emissions journey. Despite taking concrete steps to implement its climate action plan under the Paris Agreement, China’s absolute emissions have continued to rise, positioning it as the world’s second-largest historical emitter after the US.

Concurrently, its industrial strategy has transformed it into the world’s dominant power in green technology and clean energy manufacturing. Clean energy sectors now account for 11.4% of its GDP and drive over one-third of its overall economic growth.

This transition has changed the landscape of climate diplomacy. It brings immense opportunities alongside heightened global responsibilities. China now plays an enormous role in shaping international clean energy markets, influencing countries’ climate and development ambitions, and defending the Paris Agreement with the US actively in opposition to it.

Looking ahead: a ‘torchbearer’ role for China in a polycentric system

The Paris Agreement is entering a new phase, having finalised its rulemaking process. Beyond the UN climate negotiations, decisions on climate action are also taking place across a range of plurilateral and bilateral initiatives and venues. Countries that wish to be positive and proactive leaders in the multilateral space need to engage in these other venues too.

International observers and policy scholars characterise Beijing’s ambitions as playing a “torchbearing” role. Chinese policy documents, including the 15th Five-Year Plan for Climate Change and official diplomatic briefs, formalise this mandate as expanding China’s “guiding power, shaping power, and moral appeal” in multilateral climate governance, while acting as a “leader/guide” (Yǐnlǐng zhě) for global ecological transition.

What might this look like in practice? As I see it, there are four key areas where China could provide important leadership with Chinese characteristics. These are all worth watching closely over the coming years of climate negotiations, as global climate governance transitions into a more polycentric and multi-layered system.

Three ways China can be a torchbearer on climate

Firstly, there is China’s role strengthening multilateralism and defending the Paris Agreement. To this end, it can help ensure that the UN’s climate science body, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, continues to form the unshakeable foundation for international policy decisions. It can utilise its real-economy experience in renewable energy and clean tech to ensure the second Global Stocktake accelerates implementation and drives market-wide decarbonisation. China could also move beyond purely bilateral aid by contributing directly to formal multilateral mechanisms, such as the Adaptation Fund, and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage.

Secondly, China could expand its role into plurilateral arrangements. It has not historically participated in such formats but at COP30 in Brazil last year, it began taking steps in this direction, participating alongside Brazil and the EU in the Open Coalition on Compliance Carbon Markets – to strengthen cooperation on domestic carbon pricing systems.

Expanding this engagement to participate in and lead, or co-lead, plurilateral coalitions – such as the emerging global clean electrification initiative ahead of COP31 – would demonstrate a more dynamic, collaborative leadership model.

Thirdly, China must ensure that its South-South cooperation contributes to local value creation in the Global South. Data from the University of Bath’s CGEL database demonstrates that Chinese actors are highly active bilaterally. They provide project-based support, capacity building, technical training and green investment principles, under schemes like the Belt and Road infrastructure initiative.

Building ‘eye-level’ partnerships

Beyond trade and diplomatic declarations, China’s torchbearer role hinges on transforming its economic relationship with developing countries. Historically, international green supply chains have often mirrored extractive patterns: developing nations supply raw materials (such as critical minerals) while importing finished low-carbon equipment from more developed countries. To build genuine “eye-level” partnerships, China can move beyond traditional transactional or donor-recipient export models, and toward joint value creation.

This requires supporting green industrialisation in partner nations across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America through local joint ventures, domestic component assembly, joint R&D ecosystems, and meaningful workforce skills training. In this way, China can demonstrate that its green industrial growth is an inclusive engine for shared economic resilience and growth, rather than a driver of premature de-industrialisation elsewhere.

Lastly, the China-EU axis must be recalibrated. With the US stepping back from multilateral climate commitments and prioritising domestic fossil fuel interests, the bilateral relationship between China and the European Union becomes paramount.

Both sides share a strong interest in maintaining a stable, science-based international climate architecture. But they need to move beyond traditional comfort zones. They must build a comprehensive framework that addresses climate action alongside complex economic issues – trade disputes, overcapacity concerns, energy security, industrial policy. Establishing a fair competitive environment while cooperating on global standards will determine whether the two powers can effectively anchor global climate stability.

As we have seen, in the last two decades China has moved from a defensive participant in the UN climate process to an increasingly important, if quiet, protagonist. Now, as the world’s largest emitter and provider of affordable clean energy solutions, its further evolution will likely involve a continuous balancing act between domestic economic priorities and expanding international opportunities and obligations.

To play a genuine torchbearer role in the emerging polycentric era, China needs to align its economic interests with effective global climate governance. This means anchoring multilateralism in sound IPCC science, contributing to international climate funds, fostering local value creation across developing nations, and building coalitions with partners like the EU.